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ABSTRACT
This case study of the current U . S .-Japanese bilateral
relationship attempts to provide empirical insights into the themes
of
interdependence,
change,
uncertainty
and
cooperation
in
international relations. It examines the growing interdependencies
between the two nations as both are becoming more sensitive and
vulnerable to each others choices.
In addition, it analyzes the
constraining effects of rapid change on a state's ability to adapt
to a transforming environment.
The management of uncertainty
produced by these dynamics has important implications for future
forms of cooperation between the U.S. and Japan.
Although both
states are redefining goals and policies, their future relationship
will remain similar to the present.
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THE POLITICAL PROCESS OF INTERDEPENDENCE
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN

CHAPTER 1
INTERDEPENDENCE AND PROBLEMS OF COOPERATION
IN A WORLD OF SHIFTING CAPABILITIES
INTRODUCTION
The themes of interdependence, change and cooperation have
become central to the study of international relations.
WWII, the pace of change has increased,

Since

forcing states to become

mutually dependent in their economic, political, military and
social relations.

This complex interdependence and the ability

of states to adapt to change affects the possibilities of
cooperation and of conflict.
This thesis attempts to show the difficulty of identifying
national goals and formulating policies as state power, perceived
interests and cultural values are changing.

It will not discuss

the forces for change so much as their effects and the attempts
that have been made to manage them.

Consequently, the difficulty

of adjusting to new world roles has profound implications for
cooperation and world order.
As a case study I will focus on the U . S .-Japanese bilateral
relationship which, because of its combined economic and military
power,
system.

inevitably affects the stability of the international
The relationship provides a good example of both the

positive and negative effects of interdependence and the problems
of adjusting policies to mutual expectations in a world of
shifting capabilities.

First, I will briefly discuss the

2
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differing definitions of interdependence and their broader
implications concerning uncertainty, cooperation and conflict.

INTERDEPENDENCE 1

Definitions

Most definitions of interdependence discuss either its
constraining effects on a state's ability to make independent
choices, or, the relative impact of both events resulting from
these choices and the forces of the international system on state
behavior.2

For example, Oran Young defines the concept as

"...the extent to which events occurring in any given part or
within any given component unit of a world system affect (either
physically or perceptually)

events taking place in each of the

other parts or component units of the system."3

Young, then,

takes a systems approach in defining interdependence by focusing
on the degree of impact of events on actors within the
international system.
1 Interdependence here refers to dependency relationships
between "developed" states.
2 For a good summary of the different assumptions held by
realists and pluralists concerning international relations, see
International Relations Theory: Realism. Pluralism, and Globalism
, ed. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (New York: MacMillan
Publishing Company, 1987), 11.
3 Oran Young, "Interdependencies in World Politics," in
International Relations Theory: Realism. Pluralism, and
Globalism. ed. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (New York:
MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), 726-50.
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Arthur Stein states that "...an actor's returns are a
function of other's choices as well as its own...interdependence
in the international arena...makes mutual expectations, and
therefore perceptions, very important."4

Contrasting this

definition with Young's, Stein emphasizes the degree to which
actors' choices affect one another in addition to the influence
of the international system itself.

The context of

interdependence forces states to take into account mutual
expectations as the use of force becomes less relevant.
Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, as theorists who
attempt to integrate both realist and pluralist perspectives,
study both the influence of actor's choices and the international
system on outcomes.

For instance, they state that

interdependence entails "reciprocal effects among countries or
among actors in different countries".5

They do not attempt to

prove whether state choices or the structure of the international
system produce reciprocal effects. Rather,
both do.

it is assumed that

This definition focusses on the outcomes themselves and

their effects on other countries.

The drawback, however,

in

focusing on the international level of analysis lies in the

4 Arthur Stein, "Coordination and collaboration: Regimes in
an Anarchic World," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D.
Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 132.
5 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Realism and Complex
Interdependence," in International Relations Theory: Realism.
Pluralism, and Globalism. ed. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi
(New York, N.Y.: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), 381.

inevitable downplaying of the importance of the domestic policy
making process on outcomes.
In examining the U . S .-Japanese changing relationship, both
state policies and the transformation of the international system
will affect its future character.

Currently, the interaction of

these two variables is causing friction between the two
countries.

Underlying these dynamics and the realization that

states must reevaluate past policies,

is a relative shift in

power defined more in terms of economic rather than military
influence.
Reciprocal effects created by policies and the transforming
system vary according to the degree and type of interdependence.
Further,

international issues arising from these effects are the

result of states questioning the terms of interdependence.6
example,

For

in terms of the current trade dispute, Japan may ask the

question; can we drastically reduce trade with the U.S. in order
to decrease our dependency upon them?

They may also ask; can we

effectively defend ourselves without U.S. military forces?
U.S. may ask the same question concerning trade with Japan.

The
In

addition, does the U.S. need military base rights in Japan or can
it transfer them to other areas which would be just as effective?
To clarify interdependent relationships, Ernst Haas defines
them in terms of sensitivity and vulnerability.

He states that;

6 Ernst Haas, "Why Collaborate?
Issue-linkage and
international regimes," World Politics (1987): 362.

6
Sensitivity is measured by the perceived effects of
interrupting a pattern of interdependence.
Vulnerability is
measured by the opportunity costs incurred by making
alternative arrangements for collaboration when the initial
arrangement breaks down.
Unequal sensitivity and
vulnerability amount to asymmetrical interdependence.7

The U.S.-Japan interdependent relationship includes issue-areas
such as defense, trade and foreign aid where the degree and type
of dependence within each varies over time.
Sensitivity can be used in the context of the U.S.-Japan
economic relationship while vulnerability can be used to analyze
the military relationship.

The sensitivity of Japan shifting its

trading or investment pattern away from the U.S. is measured
according to the perceived effects on its own economy as well as
the U.S..

In terms of vulnerability, some Japanese and U.S.

policy-makers are weighing the opportunity costs of making
alternative military arrangements between the two countries.
They are questioning the initial arrangements, outlined in the
Mutual Security Treaty, because of the perceived inability of the
U.S. to maintain overseas commitments at current levels.
However, measuring these variables to determine the degree of
asymmetry in the overall relationship is a difficult task.
Analysts,

for instance, use trade and financial flows and the

number of troops and aircraft carriers as objective measurements.
However, the interpretation becomes

subjective

when determining

which is more influential, economic or military power.

7 Ibid., 363.

Nevertheless, choices made by both countries plus the
transformation of the international system will affect their
future relationship.

In both instances, relative power shifts

will influence the outcomes.

Broader Implications

Just as interdependence encompasses many definitions,
fosters broader implications for policy.

it

Realists such as Waltz

focus on the dominance-dependence relationship where dependence
implies vulnerability,

increasing the chances of conflict.

In

order to avoid this outcome, states should seek to be less
interdependent and less vulnerable to other state's actions in
order to survive in the international system.8

Maximizing power

implies decreasing one's dependency on other states.
Pluralists focus on the asymmetry of state to state and
group to group relations which may result in cooperation just as
much as conflict.

To provide a balanced understanding of

international relations, that is, focussing on peaceful change
rather than war as a mechanism for change, pluralists attempt to
explain how states cooperate given their interdependent
relationship.
Elaborating on the theme of mutual effects, Keohane
emphasizes the asymmetry and sensitivity of state relations.

8 Viotti and Kauppi, 54.

8
"...Interdependence by no means implies equality.
Interdependent relationships are more or less
asymmetrical depending on the characteristics of issue
areas and the attitudes and interests of elites, as
well as on the aggregate levels of power of the states
involved.
Thus we use the term "interdependence" to
imply some degree of mutual effect"9
As relative dependency shifts, in the case of the U.S. and Japan,
both countries attempt to adjust policies within issue areas such
as military, trade and finance, and foreign aid.

Although this

period of uncertainty may cause some discord, the presence of
conflicting and complementary interests can create the potential
for cooperation.

In the long run, states may find it in their

best interest to adjust policies to the preferences of others.
According to these possibilities, then, the concept of
interdependence bears directly on the problems of uncertainty and
subsequently the possibilities of cooperation and discord in
international relations.

THE RELATION BETWEEN INTERDEPENDENCE AND UNCERTAINTY

The broad concept of change also influences types and
degrees of interdependence and uncertainty.10

It affects the

vulnerability and sensitivity of one state to another.

As

9 Keohane and Nye, "International Interdependence and
Integration", in Viotti and Kauppi, 361-378.
10 Robert Gilpin identifies processes such as economic
globalization and internationalization of production that are
transforming relationships into higher levels of interdependence.
See "Forces for Change," Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry,
no. 3 (1989): 27.

preferences are based on state power, perceived interests, and
cultural values, the effects of change on these variables can
also cause uncertainty in state relations.
Realists such as Kenneth Waltz, David Singer and Karl
Deutsch all agree that uncertainty is a function of the number of
actors involved.11

As the number of actors in the international

system increases, so does the amount of uncertainty about the
effects of actions taken by decision-makers.

Combining the

implications of Stein's idea of interdependence with the above
conclusion, as the number of actors in the international system
increase, so do the number of choices an actor must confront.
The reciprocal effects of these choices depends on the actor's
own decisions as well as others.
This conclusion implies that the capacity of states to
gather accurate information concerning others' preferences
decreases as many more actors are included in the system.

Thus,

uncertainty results when information is difficult to obtain,
making expectations unknown.

This uncertainty influences the

possibilities for cooperation.

11 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World,"
Daedalus 93 (Summer 1964): 881-909; Karl W. Deutsch and J. David
Singer, "Multipolar power systems and International Stability,"
World Politics 16, no. 3 (April 1964): 390-406. Cited in Viotti
and Kauppi, 54.
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UNCERTAINTY AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION OR DISCORD 12

Many Realists, searching for the causes of war, focus on the
confusion prevalent before major wars such as WWI and WWII.

When

mutual expectations are unknown, misperceptions about an actor's
intentions and events may produce inappropriate policies.
According to realists such as Waltz, as this uncertainty
increases, the potential of actors to misjudge intentions is more
likely to cause conflict.13
In contrast, Singer and Deutsch, maintain that uncertainty
produces cooperation.

Uncertainty forces actors to be cautious

and to "follow tried and true policies of the past".14

Any

mistake in formulating new policies may be too costly in terms of
loss of military, economic and political power.15

However,

12 Examining the concept of cooperation, Robert Axelrod and
Robert Keohane state that, "...world politics is not a
homogeneous state of war: cooperation varies among issues and
over time".
Furthermore, "cooperation is not equivalent to
harmony.
Harmony requires complete identity of interests, but
cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a
mixture of conflicting and complementary interests.
In such
situations, cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior
to the actual or anticipated preferences of others.
Cooperation,
thus defined is not necessarily good from a moral point of view".
A state's conception of cooperation affects the possibilities of
achieving it.
See "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy:
Strategies and Institutions," International Organization : 226.
13 Viotti and Kauppi, 54.
14 Ibid.
15 ibid.
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inevitably, change seems to force a redefinition of power,
interests, policies and goals.

Following proven policies of the

past becomes outdated and inappropriate as the context of the
relationship changes.

Cooperation or conflict depends on whether

states can adjust policies to changing expectations.

The larger

question, which is beyond the scope of this paper but
nevertheless related, asks which is the most likely method of
cooperation on the international level.
leadership,

Will hegemonic

international regimes or some compromise of the two

facilitate stability?

CONCLUSION

This broad development of interdependence, the causes of
uncertainty and its effects on cooperation and conflict bears
directly on the U . S .-Japanese relationship.

The current disputes

in trade and defense areas illustrate the sensitivities,
vulnerabilities and asymmetries in the relationship.

Whether

they will both adapt to changes in mutually beneficial ways is
uncertain.
The body of this paper will examine the problems of
redefining world roles, their effects on policy and in turn,
their influences on the complex interdependent U . S .-Japanese
relationship.

Specifically, chapter 2 discusses the constraints

on, current attitudes regarding and possible future scenarios of
Japan's changing world role.

Chapter 3 examines the concept of
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"burden-sharing" and the difficulties of defining state goals and
identifying mutual interests while forming policy.

Chapter 4

analyzes in detail the problems within the U .S .-Japanese
relationship in the areas of military, trade and finance, and
foreign aid.

The final chapter will draw conclusions concerning

external and internal constraints on Japan as it attempts to
develop a new world role.

This process will directly affect its

relationship with the U.S. and the possibilities of cooperation.

CHAPTER 2
JAPAN'S CHANGING WORLD ROLE
This chapter discusses Japan's changing world role.

It

attempts to answer the questions: What are the constraints on
Japan's internationalization?

What are the various Japanese and

U.S. attitudes towards Japan's current role in the international
system?

What are the possible future scenarios of Japan's role?

BACKGROUND

Today the Japanese are faced with the dilemma of assuming a
leading international role yet there is no domestic or
international consensus as to what that role should be.

Japan is

the world's largest creditor nation with investments in the U.S.
reaching $280 billion and 1987 estimates of $21.8 billion in
Asia.1

It recently surpassed the U.S. as the number one donor of

foreign aid, dispersing $10 billion annually.

Japan's dramatic

increase in wealth since the 1960s has brought about an increase
in power at the international level.

As its wealth depends

largely on world trade, Japan recognizes that its national
interest now includes maintaining a stable world order.

Although

it acknowledge the need to take on a new international
responsibility for this order, domestic and international forces
constrain its ability to achieve it.

1 CRS Review, Major Issue Forum. "Japan-U.S. Relations".
101 Congress, 1st Session, July 1989.
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CONSTRAINTS ON JAPAN'S INTERNATIONALIZATION2

Japan's past reputation and, to a lesser extent, traditional
values are both obstacles to its integration into the world
political and economic arena.

Aside from its constitution which

prohibits armed aggression, the main factor

preventing Japan

from

assuming international responsibilities commensurate with its
economic power is the aggressive and brutal
acquired during WWII.

reputation it

Many Japanese fear a return to

imperialism, militarism and another devastating war, which were
the result of Japan's previous efforts to internationalize.

At

the international level, the U.S., Asian states and Western
Europe remain cautious about Japan's rise in power.

Korea and

China remain resentful towards Japan for its WWII occupation
while the U.S. uses Japan's aggressions as an excuse to contain
its expanding power.

Thus, past images shape current domestic

and international perceptions of Japan.3

Although Japan's past

imperialistic tendencies evoke concern about its current
intentions, the majority of states recognize the need for Japan
to share the burden of world stability in an era of shifting
capabilities.

The problem is, these competing perceptions

2 Barry Buzan conceptualizes Japan's internationalization as
a two-way street, that is, Japan opening up to outside influence
and foreigners being receptive to Japanese culture and society.
See his article "Japan's Future: Old History Versus New Roles",
International Affairs (1988): 573.
3 Ibid., 557.
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prevent the political consensus needed to forge Japan’s new world
r ole.
In addition to its aggressive reputation, perceptions of
traditional values limit Japan's ability to integrate into the
international system.

The Japanese, according to some, maintain

values such as "perseverance,

frugality, effort, family,

community, sacrifice, humility, the spirit of harmony and
deference for the elderly" in addition to ambition, motivation,
and drive.4

To others they are innately aggressive and ruthless.

The Japanese are ambitious and driven to create a strong Japan
but not necessarily to be a world leader.

These isolationist

tendencies are a result of its pre-WWII isolationism and the
disastrous effects of its WWII expansionism.5

But the dilemma

arises between Japan's growing economic power and pressures
forcing it to assume more responsibility for world order.
On the one hand, Japanese society does not want to revert to
imperialism or militarism, thus, a greater international role
through military means remains subordinate to domestic
considerations.

On the other hand, the Japanese want to play a

greater economic and cultural role in international society where
leadership qualities are needed.

The problem remains that if

Japan does become more ambitious and aggressive even in these
fields, Asian Pacific states and the U.S. may perceive this
4 Takashi Inoguchi, "Four Japanese Scenarios for the
future," International Affairs (1989): 13-25.
5 Ibid.
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change as a resurgence of Japanese power and expansionism.

The

fear of economic power translating into military power still
prevails especially in China and the two Koreas.6

One can see

that perceptions of Japanese intentions are still conceived in an
historical context which remains an obstacle to developing a new
leadership role for Japan.

REEVALUATION OF INTERNATIONAL ROLE

Japanese economic prosperity, a slowdown in U.S. growth and
competitiveness, and generational changes are causing Japan to
reevaluate its traditionally passive role in society.

Japan's

present role exchanges U.S. military protection for support for
U.S. foreign policy.

However, discord in the areas of trade and

defense, a result of shifting capabilities in the international
system, threatens to undermine the strong bilateral relationship
which the U.S. and Japan have maintained since the end of WWII.
Although many Japanese continue to see the U.S. as its "big
brother", this view is losing support especially among the
younger generations who seem more confident about Japan and its
future.

Increased wealth, greater demands imposed upon Japan by

its trading partners, and its doubts about U.S. capabilities and

6 Paul Kennedy observed that in the past, states whose
economic base deteriorated also declined militarily.
See
his book, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York: Random
House, 1987).
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commitments are spurring this reevaluation.7

Thus, external

forces as well as internal elements are pressuring Japan to make
difficult choices concerning its future world role.

PRESENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS ROLE

The U.S. first saw Japan as an expansionist, militaristic
state during WWII.

After WWII and the establishment of the

Mutual Security Treaty, the U.S. became Japan's protectorate by
dominating its foreign policy and financially supporting its
reconstruction.

In return, devastated by the war, Japan was

content to play the role of "little brother" and political ally
to the U.S..

Japan's interests coincided with the U.S.'s, that

is, both wanted the reconstruction and democratization of Japan
for trade and security reasons.8
One view, then, portrays Japan as a "little brother",
obedient and supportive to U.S. security interests while the U.S.
insures prosperity and protection from foreign aggression.

That

view, however, has been changing since 1960 as the burden of
responsibility for world order is proving too great for the U.S.

7 "Sharing the Defense Burden with Japan: How much is
enough?," Japan Economic Institute, no. 19A (13 May 1988): 3.
8 Mike Mansfield, "The U.S. and Japan: Sharing our
Destinies," Foreicrn Affairs (Spring 1989):

18
to shoulder alone.9

U.S. commitments are exceeding capacity in

military, economic and foreign aid terms reflected in large
budget deficits.

Much of the frustration which coincides with

this dilemma is directed toward Japan because of its huge trade
surplus with the U.S.
From this development, a second American view concerning
what role Japan plays in the international arena sees Japan as a
"free-rider" on defense and executors of unfair trade practices.
Patricia Schroeder, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Burdensharing cited U.S. commitments exceeding capacity and Japan's
inadequate contributions as reasons why Japan should shoulder a
bigger share of defense responsibility.10
These competing views stem from differing assumptions
concerning common interests.

James Fallows maintains that U.S.-

Japanese interests clash in a fundamental way.

He states that

the;
...conflict arises from Japan's inability or
unwillingness to restrain the one-sided and destructive
expansion of its economic power.
It is one-sided
because Japanese business does to other countries what
Japan will not permit to be done to itself.
It is
destructive because it will lead to exactly the
international ostracism that Japan most fears, because
it will wreck the postwar system of free trade that has
made Japan and many other nations prosperous, and

9 For a critique of the declinist literature see Samuel P.
Huntington's "The U.S.-Decline or Renewal?," Foreign Affairs
(1989).
10 House Committee on Armed Services, The Interim Report of
The Defense Burdensharing Panel. 100th Cong., 2nd sess., August
1988, Committe Print, 23, 62-66.
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because it will ultimately make the U . S .-Japanese
partnership impossible to sustain.11

Mike Mansfield,

former U.S. Ambassador to Japan from 1977-89,

argues that the U.S. and Japan share the same fundamental
interests and objectives; "...a more secure, democratic and
prosperous world." 12 Basing his argument on the assumption that
interdependence produces uncertainty, Mansfield states that he is
optimistic "because neither the U.S. nor Japan have the option of
going it alone anymore.

13

Both sides have more to gain by

cooperating on trade and defense issues than by pursing different
paths.

Though they may not have common interests, pressures may

force the two to cooperate.

That is, in theoretical terms,

cooperation based on common aversion may prevail.14

Neither side

wants an unstable system because their success depends on stable
trade and defense relations.

He cites foreign economic

assistance, contributions to international organizations and
regional issues as areas where the U.S. and Japan enjoy
cooperation.15
11 James Fallows,
1989): 41.
12 Mansfield,

"Containing Japan," The Atlantic (May

13.

13 Ibid., 15.
14 See Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration:
Regimes in an Anarchic World," ed. Stephen D. Krasner,
International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983),
125-127.
15 Mansfield,

13.
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These contradictory views of Japan on both sides do not
provide a consensus as to what Japan's future role ought to be.
The Japanese view themselves as on the one hand a nonconfrontational, isolationist nation and on the other a promoter
of world peace and development.

The U.S. sees Japan as a

combination "little brother", political ally 16 , "free-rider"
and opportunistic economic power.

A reevaluation of history

which shows that Japan's past was normal when compared to
Germany's past would be useful in changing Japan's "bad"
reputation.17

JAPAN'S POSSIBLE FUTURE WORLD ROLES

As stated earlier, both the U.S. and Japan are ambivalent
towards what role Japan should play in the international system.
Inoguchi's "visions of the future" encompassing the next 25-50
years present different views on "the future

of global

development, the distribution of economic and military power, and
institutionalization for peace and development".18
"Pax Americana II", "Joint Hegemony",

"Pax Consortium" and "Pax

Nipponica" all foresee different roles for Japan in economics,
defense and foreign aid.
16 The Japanese are apprehensive toward
using the term
"alliance" because it implies a military role for Japan in its
relationship with the U.S.
17 Buzan, 566.
18 Inoguchi,

16.
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Pax Americana II

Most Americans imagine the U.S. retaining its leadership
role in the world and taking advantage of the institutions of
order and security it created after WWII. 19 The image reflects
the importance of international regimes and the balancing of the
Western alliance while the U.S. revives "composure and
confidence", combining it with "...the somber recognition of the
inevitability of national decline in the longer term".20

Paul

Kennedy uses the term "imperial overstretch" to describe the
U.S.'s current dilemma.21

He maintains that U.S. military and

security commitments have drained the domestic economy to the
point of national decline.22
This view is popular in Japan because it allows Japan to
play its traditional economic role while the U.S. continues to
shoulder the burden of global security.
would be number two to the U.S..

In this scenario, Japan

Currently, this position is

more appealing to the Japanese than Japan as number one, but how

19 Inoguchi, 19.
See also Sammuel P. Huntington,
Decline or Renewal?".
20 Inoguchi,

19.

21 Kennedy, 515.
22 Ibid.

"The U.S.-

22

long this would last is unsure.23

Japanese such as Koichi Kato,

a prominent member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), says
for the next twenty years, Japan would maintain its number two
position to the U.S. but after a couple of decades, Japan and the
U.S. would share the lead in an "equal partnership".24

Joseph S.

Nye agrees that Japan is our main economic rival but states that
the U.S.

is likely to remain number one because it is unlikely

that Japan will achieve both military and economic dominance.25
Japan would adhere to increased free trade practices,
finance and increased Official Development Assistance which would
benefit the U.S., ASEAN, and the European Community.

Domestic

and international factors will continue to restrain Japanese
assertiveness in the security area, subordinating it to U.S.
security leadership.

Thus, the "division of labor" will remain

similar to the present.26

The success of this scenario depends

on the scientific and technological dynamism both in the U.S. and
Japan.27

23 Hobart Rowen, "The U.S. Should Accept Idea of Sharing
Power With Japan," Christian Science Monitor (23 Oct. 1988).
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Inoguchi,
27 Ibid., 25.

20.
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Joint Hegemony28

Political Scientists, economists and businessmen support the
idea of "joint hegemony" because it articulates the "development
and integration" of the Japan-U.S. economy.

The importance of

this integration is supported by Robert Gilpin who states:
...As Japan has become the world's foremost creditor nation
with a high yen, its internal domestic and international
policies have had to change...Japan is attempting to reduce
trade friction and increase its own economic stability
through shifting to greater dependence on domestic economic
growth.
Of equal importance, however, is that the Japanese
are attempting to use their newly gained financial and
technological strength to create, through large exports of
capital and overseas production by Japanese multinational
firms, what can best be described as a new "co-prosperity
sphere" in the Pacific Basin, in North America and, if the
West Europeans will let them, in the European unified
m arket...2 9
In this sense,
outcome.30

integration is seen as both a process and an

It can be broken down into two types, that of

economic integration and policy integration between the U.S. and
other regions.

This integration also creates a dependency

relationship between Japan and the U.S..

Japan's economic power

will be dependent upon trade within U.S. and Asian markets and
its military security will be dependent upon the U.S. security
28 John W. Dower, "Dual-use technology; Japan's new military
edge," The Nation
(3 July 1989).
29 Robert Gilpin, "Forces for Change," The Journal of
Japanese Trade and Industry No.3 (1989): 29.
30 For a good discussion of the distinctions made between
the terms "interdependence" and "integration" see Robert 0.
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "International Interdependence and
Integration," eds. Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations
Theory: Realism. Pluralism, and Globalism. 364.

24
system in Asia.

For the U.S., it will continue to need Japanese

markets for exports, Japanese finance and their collaboration on
high technology developments for defense.
that both

It is assumed, then,

the U.S. and Japan will maintain common long-term

interests which will allow for both economic and policy
integration.
This
fact that

image differs from Pax Americana II by emphasizing

the

Japanese economic power could be translated into

military power.

But, the feasibility of joint hegemony depends

on whether or not Japan can change its image as an imperialistic,
expansionist nation to a more non-threatening one.31

"Pax Consortium"

This image portrays an environment where no single actor
dominates the rest.32

It rests on the idea of the usefulness of

international regimes and the "pluralistic nature of policy
adjustment among the major actors".33

It resembles Pax Americana

II with its emphasis on "cooperation under Anarchy" and "regimes"
but it does not advocate the necessity of "moral leadership" or
"administrative guidance" by the U.S.34

Many Japanese support

this image because it shuns military solutions to security issues
31 Buzan, 570.
32 Inoguchi, 22.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
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and decreases U.S. ability to throw its weight around by focusing
on the utility of international regimes.

In this scenario, world

order is maintained not by a hegemon, but through consensual
leadership.
Japan's roles in this image include the pursuit of "quiet
economic diplomacy" and the creation of a "world free of military
solutions".35
NICs,

Regionally, Japan would be the leader of the Asian

representing their economic and security interests in the

international system.

"Pax Nipponica"36

The rise in the value of the yen compared to the U.S.
dollar, Japan's position as the world's largest creditor nation,
superior competitiveness and foreign dependence on Japanese
technology and products, and increasing nationalism support a
future scenario of Japan's economic power dominating the
international system.37

Japan's international role as "balancer

among the continental powers" depends on the elimination of
nuclear weapons or development of an anti-nuclear defense
system.38

At present, the latter seems more feasible.

Already

35 Ibid.
36 Ezra Vogel,
1986): 753.

"Pax Nipponica?," Foreign Affairs

37 Ibid.
38 Inoguchi,

23.

(Spring
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Japan is working jointly with the U.S. on the SDI.

Because

Japan's global role portrays it as the leading power,
regional role will also depict Japan similarly.39

its

This scenario

emphasizes a shift from a military to economic definition of
power, thus positioning Japan as world leader.
While it is difficult to defend the importance and
likelihood of each scenario, this analysis does add to an
understanding of the possible directions which Japan's changing
role may take.

Again, Pax Americana II envisions Japan playing

its traditional economic role while the U.S. continues to
shoulder the burden of global security.

Joint hegemony

emphasizes the integration of the U . S .-Japanese economies and
policies.

Japan's leadership role would be primarily economic

while the U.S. would maintain its political and security
leadership.

Pax consortium focuses on the usefulness of

international regimes and the possibility that no single actor
dominates the rest.

Finally, Pax Nipponica portrays Japan's

economic power dominating the world system as opposed to the
traditional military might of the U.S. and Soviet Union.
Two polls given by the Japanese government and by academics
attempt to determine what the ordinary Japanese citizen thinks
Japan's role ought to be.
question;

The government poll asked the

"What kind of role do you think Japan should play in

39 Ibid.
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the community of nations?".40

The 1987 poll produced the

following results;
1) 50.4% answered Japan should contribute to the
healthy development of the world economy.
2) 3 4.0% answered Japan should cooperate in the
economic development of the LDCs.
3) 31.0% answered that Japan should make contributions
in scientific, technological and cultural
exchange.
4) 24.2% answered that Japan should make contributions
in the area of international political affairs
such as mediator in regional disputes.
5) 7.8% answered that Japan should consolidate its
defense capability as a member of the Western
camp.
The results indicate that most Japanese do not want their country
to play a major political or security role in the world.
The academic poll asked what emphasis should the government
place on different government policies.41

The results included;

55.7% support for domestic economic management,

55.7% support for

law and order, 45.2% support for social welfare, 44.5% feel the
government should improve the standard of living, 29.7% think the
government should emphasize economic power, 27.8% feel the
government should focus on global economic welfare,

18.8% want

Japan to target national solidarity and 11.3% feel the government
should pursue national security as a top priority.

40 Department
Minister, Gaiko ni
diplomacy) (Tokyo:
Cited in Inoguchi,

These results

of Public Relations, Office of the Prime
kansuru yoron chosa (Opinion poll on
Office of the Prime Minister, April 1988).
16.

41 Joji Watanuki et al., Nihonjin no senkyo kodo (Japanese
electoral behavior) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1986).
Cited in Inoguchi.
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highlight top priority for domestic considerations of social and
economic welfare.
These results indicate a priority given by Japanese citizens
to domestic, economic and cultural issues compared to security
contributions to Japan's desired international role.

However,

The Japanese public strongly supports increased military
contributions within the limits set by the U.S.-Japan Mutual
Security Treaty.42 This concern is based primarily on a common
distrust of the Soviet Union.43
Although Japan gives the perception that it wants to become
a major world actor through diplomatic and economic means, other
pressures force it to confront military issues.

The government

and most foreign countries want Japan to play a greater role in
security issues.
For example, Ex-Prime Minister Takeshita stated at the
Toronto Summit of June, 1988 that Japan should promote an image
of "Japan which contributes to the world" through "international
cultural exchange",

"cooperation for peace" and "official

development assistance".44

Although this statement corresponds

with domestic opinion, government actions have also appeased
42 Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, Defending an Economic
Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 51-52.
43 Ibid.
44 Noboru Takeshita, "A New Impetus for Japan-U.S.
Relations- Contributing More to the World" (Address delivered at
a dinner hosted by the Japan-America Society of Chicago, Chicago,
IL, 22 June 1988), 5.
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foreign demands.

Japan agreed to collaborate with the U.S. on

development of the FSX fighter planes, gave monetary assistance
to U.S. surveillance of the Persian Gulf, and increased its
military budget beyond the 1% of GNP barrier.

Thus, one can see

the Japanese government struggling to satisfy both domestic and
foreign demands.

Japanese leadership seems to react to these

demands rather than initiating change.

Whether or not the new

government and prime minister are able to effectively lead Japan
in both defining its new role and fulfilling it remains
questionable.

CONCLUSION

As the Japanese people and certain government officials
expressed, Japan wants to emphasize its economic and cultural
role in internationl society.

It recognizes the need to assume

more responsibility for world stability

but through diplomatic

and economic rather than military and security means.

Although

the rhetoric may sound idealistic, Japan pursues its interests
according to cost and benefits analysis.

They reason that it is

far more beneficial to pursue economic interests of increased
trade and business ventures in order to create a strong Japan
than to spend huge sums of money on military hardware.
How to assume this leadership role without spurring internal
and external opposition, however, remains a dilemma.
expansionist,

Its past

imperialistic reputation remains an obstacle to
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cooperation both between Japan and the U.S. and between Japan and
the international community.

Members of ASEAN, China and to a

certain extent, the U.S. fear a resurgence of Japanese military
might based on its economic power.

As Japan struggles to define

its new role, the current uncertainty limits prospects for
cooperation.
The problem of defining a new role relates to the
development and implementation of policy.

Because an increasing

number of internal and external interests are involved, clear
definitions of goals and thus policies designed to achieve them
are difficult to establish.

The following chapter examines the

perceptions of and misperceptions about Japanese and U.S.
interests which complicate their relations.

CHAPTER 3
BURDEN-SHARING:
AN AMERICAN POLITICAL CONCEPT OF INTERDEPENDENCE
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter examined Japan's changing world role.
Specifically,

it analyzed the constraints to its

internationalization, the differing views of the roles it plays,
and various future scenarios of its world role.

The results show

Japan's intention to assume a responsibility for world stability
through economic and diplomatic, rather military, means.
However, U.S. demands that Japan spend more on defense, thereby
sharing this burden with the U.S., conflicts with this view.
The following chapter will discuss the concept of "burdensharing" by focussing on the bilateral relationship between the
U.S. and Japan.

First, I will briefly trace the evolution of

"burden-sharing" from the late 19 60s to the present.

Over time,

the definition of the concept changed to fit the political and
security concerns of the U.S.

The second section will further

discuss connotations of "burden-sharing" as a political concept
and introduce "comprehensive security cooperation" as an
alternative conceptual approach.

The conclusion will show the

relationships among "cooperation" as a goal and "burden-sharing"
and "comprehensive security" as approaches to the current
discord.

Because burden-sharing is based

on the ambiguous idea

of "fairness",

it affects conceptions of cooperative

arrangements.

Arguments over approaches to cooperation in three

31

32
fields? defense, trade and finance, and foreign aid, jeopardize
possibilities of mutual adjustment between the U.S. and Japan.
The U.S. coined the term "burden-sharing" as a principle
embodying a specific U.S. approach to facilitate cooperation in
an interdependent world.

The concept advocates greater security

contributions by Japan to its alliance with the U.S. These
demands were established to alleviate the pressures involved with
being both a military and economic world power. It is also
intended to serve as a strategy through which the U.S., concerned
about the slow-down of its economic expansion and Japan,
overwhelmed with demands from the international community to
assume a leadership role, could coordinate their policies in
order to achieve common objectives.
As the U.S. economy expands less rapidly relative to that of
other states, namely Japan , its capacity to maintain overseas
military, trade and foreign aid commitments has decreased.

Given

this unstable condition, the U.S., according to Samuel P.
Huntington,

faces the choice of; retrenching its commitments,

decreasing threats through diplomacy, demanding increased
contributions by its allies ("burden-sharing"), increasing its
military power and spending, replacing comparatively costly power
with cheaper power or developing a strategy to display its
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capabilities.1

In response to these alternatives, the U.S.

is

focussing on "burden-sharing" as a priority.2

DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION OF CONCEPT

Past

Burden-sharing in the past was based on a more stable
relationship between the U.S. and Japan.3

The term itself was

conceived in the early 1960s as a response to the high costs of
U.S. military commitments in Vietnam.4

Congress wanted to reduce

U.S. troops and to ask allies to "help us out" in the effort to
fight the communist insurgency in South Vietnam.5

In this

context, Japan, because of its relatively weak position both in
the international system and in its relationship with the U.S.,
did not think of "burden-sharing" in terms of "power-sharing".
1 Samuel Huntington, "Coping With the Lippman Gap," Foreign
A f f a i r s . vol. 66, no.3 (1988): 456.
2 See House Committee on Armed Services, The Interim Report
of the Defense Burdensharing Panel.
3 However, as John W. Dower points out in "Dual-use
Technology; Japan's New Military Edge," p. 18, U.S. policy toward
Japan was set in an "explicit context of institutionalized
mistrust".
He refers to the 1947 Peace Constitution imposed upon
Japan, The Mutual Security Treaty of 1951-52, and joint
operational studies concerning Japan's defense capabilities as
evidence of U.S. mistrust towards Japan.
4 "Sharing the Defense Burden With Japan: How Much is
Enough?," Japan Economic Institute, no. 19A (13 MAy 1988): 2-3.
5 Ibid.
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Because of their increasing economic strength compared to the
U.S.'s, however, the Japanese are changing the meaning of burdensharing to include influence in decision-making with the U.S..
By 1978-79 a series of international conflicts, namely the
Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,
required U.S. responses.

They raised the need for costly

security outlays and caused the U.S. to demand that allies
contribute to the "burdens of mutual defense" commensurate with
their economic capabilities.6
In the 1980s, huge budget and trade deficits,
and $53.8 billion (with Japan)

$1 trillion

respectively, are causing the U.S.

to reevaluate its overseas commitments.

The U.S. believes it can

no longer carry the costs of its national security interests
alone.

Therefore, the U.S., especially Congress, believes that

Japan should spend more money on its own defense.
Japan, on the other hand,

faces many obstacles constraining

its ability to answer demands for a military buildup. Its
constitution renounces war and the Mutual Security Treaty
concluded after WWII limits Japan's army to defensive
capabilities.

The government's 197 6 decision to limit defense

spending to 1% of GDP, domestic criticism based on memories of
WWII and external fears of a remilitarized Japan have made it
difficult for Japan to answer U.S. demands.

6 Ibid.
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Present

Burden-sharing is now linked to trade disputes which include
elements of distrust not previously encountered in the JapaneseU.S. relationship.

T o day’s fears and suspicions do not just

represent a new level of misunderstanding.

Rather, they are

"rooted in very real and rapid transformations in the basic
structures of power and influence".7
Whether or not and how to share the costs of U.S. overseas
commitments are recurrent issues between the U.S. and Japan.
They are also highly emotional issue because the U.S.'s position
has not improved despite negotiations and economic policies
designed to reduce the trade deficit.8

Japan continues to

maintain huge trade surpluses which makes it an easy target for
U.S. criticism concerning the fair and equitable sharing of world
responsibilities.
Both in the past and present people have interpreted burdensharing differently.

Traditionally, alliance management and

burden-sharing denoted similar meanings.

They both were

conceived strictly in military terms based on common security
interests.

In this context, trade and economic issues were

separated from military considerations.

7 Dower,

18.

8 However, the volume of U.S. exports, as opposed to the
value, has actually increased, leading some Japanese to accuse
the U.S. of exaggerating the situation.
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Today, however, the concept of "burden-sharing" takes on a
number of meanings most often stated by government officials of
both the U.S. and Japan.

Within the U.S., Richard L. Armitage,

former assistant secretary of defense for international security
affairs, defined burden-sharing as "...a more equitable sharing
of the roles, risks, and responsibilities of the defense of the
free w orld...burden-sharing for democracy".9

Referring to

"defense", he emphasizes the original military aspect of the
phrase which focuses on common security interests.

But "burden-

sharing for democracy" places the U.S.-Japan relationship in the
context of the post-WWII thinking where the containment of
communism and the spread of Democracy were the primary goals
which reflected world order.

Today, many argue that the U.S.

should abandon its Cold War policies and focus on economic
development as a means to achieve world order.
Former Treasury Secretary James Baker III has expressed the
opinion that Japan and Western Europe should share the burden of
U.S. costs abroad not just in political and national security
terms, but also in economic areas by pursuing free trade
practices.

His comment indicated the first time that "burden-

sharing" had been discussed by the Administration in an economic
sense.10

Finally, Representative James H. Scheuer , Senator Paul

Sarbanes and James Baker all agreed that Japan could transfer
9 Richard L. Armitage, "Enhancing U.S. Security In the
Pacific," Christian Science Monitor. 30 August 1988.
10 Peter Kilborn, "Baker is Weighing a Shift in Military
Costs to Japan," New York Times. 10 March 1988.
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some of its savings from military spending to increased foreign
i

aid to developing countries.11

Their approach would give burden-

sharing an enhanced meaning compared to its traditional military
emphasis.
In contrast, the Japanese emphasize economic and foreign aid
aspects of cooperation.

They use the term "comprehensive

security" rather than "burden-sharing" as a foreign policy
approach.

The former includes diplomatic leadership,

foreign

economic assistance targeted to strategic areas and strengthening
of its military within the limits of the security treaty.

This

emphasis coincides with the type of role the Japanese hope to
play in the future.

Already, because of the rise in value of the

yen, Japan surpassed the United States as the world's number one
donor of Official Development Assistance
in 1988.

(ODA) with $10 billion

Ex-Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita stated that Japan

would act according to its "concept of international cooperation"
used to define Japan's emerging world role.

This concept is

based upon programs of international cultural exchange,
cooperation in the cause of peace and increased development
assistance.12

Former Prime Minister Sosuke Uno and Foreign

Minister Hiroshi Mitsuzuka stated that they would continue
Takeshita's foreign policy which calls for Japan to make a
greater contribution to "global peace and stability" by expanding

11 Ibid.
12 The Liberal S t a r . 10 February 1989, 2.
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its economic assistance to developing nations.13

Currently,

opposition parties within the Japanese Diet, the Japanese
Parliament, claim that they would use foreign aid as their main
diplomatic tool if their party were elected into office.14

This

rhetoric coincides with Japan's efforts to increase ODA as a
response to external pressures.
As stated earlier, the Japanese are reluctant to assume a
military leadership role and are more willing to display world
leadership in economic areas.

However, the government is not

denying that it wants to be a major military actor, as opposed to
military power,

in its relationship with the U.S..

Leadership

also includes active participation in decision-making.

Thus,

In

addition to sharing the burden, the Japanese government also
reiterates "power-sharing",
but not in practice.

something the U.S. supports in theory

Mr. Kuroda,

former Vice Minister of MITI,

gives a common Japanese view of burden-sharing as being "the
other side of the coin of 'power-sharing'".15

This term refers

to the sharing of decision-making powers in defense, trade and
foreign aid matters with the U.S. and within international
organizations where the U.S., as founder of most international
13
"Foreign Minister Discusses Bilateral Ties" The Japan
Times, 4 June 1989, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
9 June 1989, 1.
14 "LDP, Opposition Disagree on Use of Aid," The Japan
Economic Journal. 2 0 May 1989, trans. Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, 25 May 1989.
15 Susan Chira, " Japan Ready to Share Burden, But Also the
Power, With U.S.," New York Times. 7 March 1989.
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organizations, dominates the decision-making processes.
Analyzing the different interpretations of the concept of burdensharing over time, therefore, reveals the importance of context,
i.e. values and perceptions,

in shaping the meaning of the term.

CONCLUSION

Burden-sharing seeks the "fair" and "equitable"
distribution of the responsibilities of maintaining a stable
bilateral relationship.
defined or measured.

However, the term "fair" is not easily

To define what is universally "fair" is

difficult because of varying cultures and values which assist in
determining individual state rules and objectives.

Different

views of "fairness", as shown in the U .S .-Japanese case, promote
conflict.
In order to clarify the U.S. position,
examine what the U.S. sees as unfair.

it is easier to

In the defense area, even

though it has been the norm, the U.S. Congress basically does not
think it is fair that Japan spends only 1% of its GNP on defense
while the U.S. spends 7%.

In trade, dumping,

subsidies, tied

exports, restrictions on market access, cartels,
(technology transfer), and

"stealing"

"copying"

(patents) are just a few

examples of current accusations of "unfair" Japanese trading
practices.16

In foreign aid, tying aid to the purchase of

16 Ellen J. Frost, For Richer. For Poorer: The New U.S.Japan Relationship (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,
(1987), 18.
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imports from Japan without opening its own markets is unfair
because this practice works against the norm of "reciprocity" in
trade.

Other examples of what Americans consider to be "unfair"

competition include size, where a bigger competitor is considered
to have an "unfair" advantage over a smaller one, secrecy as
compared to "transparency", government intervention, and lack of
initiative towards assuming world responsibilities or "free
riding" .17
Ellen Frost raises the question:

"To what extent does

fairness consist of universally applicable norms and values, and
to what extent is it the product of a unique culture and
history?"18

One can argue that it is only "fair" that Japan, as

a member of GATT, should adhere to its principles, norms and
rules.

GATT is based on the belief that free trade will promote

the economic development of all members.

The substantive norms

include liberalization, reciprocity, nondiscrimination and
economic development.19
Japan and the U.S. maintain unique cultural values which
influence how they conduct business and form policy.

These

17 Ibid., 18-19. Transparency here is used to describe U.S.
openness in terms of exposing how the government formulates
policy and how businesses interact.
It is claimed that Japan
develops policy and conducts business too secretively, preventing
foreign access to information which could benefit them.
18 Ibid.
19 Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, "The GATT and
Regulation of Trade Barriers," in International Regimes, ed.
Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983): 288.
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cultural norms should not be criticized.

What should be

criticized is the clear breaking of norms and rules of
international regimes to which Japan and the U.S. belong such as
the GATT.

However, the distinction between cultural and

universal norms is not easily made, which distorts any
measurement of "fairness".

For example, the U.S. is negotiating

the reduction of Japanese structural impediments to trade which
include, among other things,

its domestic distribution system.

Japan, however, argues that its distribution system is a unique
cultural characteristic and should not be criticized.
Assuming what is considered "fair" is to abide by GATT norms
and rules in trade, World Bank norms for disbursement of ODA and
bilateral arrangements in defense, many in the U.S. claim that
Japan is following unfair practices.

Congress and businessmen

claim that Japan is violating GATT liberalization and reciprocity
norms, WB norms of economic development and defense norms of
contributing to the alliance "according to ability".
The current discord stems from the perception that Japan is
following policies which violate these norms while the U.S. is
unable or unwilling to adapt its policies to changing norms due
to shifting capabilities.

As Keohane notes,

the only way actors

can achieve cooperation is if their "policies become
significantly more compatible with one another".20

The U.S.'s

20 Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and
Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984): 53.
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answer to the problem of achieving cooperation with Japan in a
world of shifting capabilities is through "burden-sharing".
This policy, however,

is inappropriate because it seeks a

cooperative arrangement based on quantitative measures of
equality.

Congress is, in effect, seeking to maintain the

current form of cooperation by insuring its dominant position in
issue areas, while at the same time demanding that Japan spend
more on defense and foreign aid.
best solution.

This approach may not be the

Cooperative arrangements are not always "good" or

"equal", rather, they are based on relative power shifts and
mutual interests in addition to other factors.
context matters.

In this case,

As U.S. influence declines relative to Japan,

and as Japan's influence increases, policies must adjust to the
changing situation to avoid friction.

Therefore, the best

alternative in terms of sharing the burden within issue-areas is
one which takes into account the shifts in power and the
accompanying influence.

Politically, however, conflicting self-

interests are preventing this approach.

The U.S. is not willing

to admit its loss of influence while Japan does not know how to
react to its newfound wealth.
In contrast to burdensharing,

some experts prefer to use the

term "comprehensive security cooperation" because it connotates
mutual rather than unilateral adjustment.21

Rather than offering

normative prescriptions, the defense burden-sharing panel of the
Committee on Armed Services should have formed recommendations as
21 Dalton A. West,

interview with author, 21 June 1989.
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requests or proposals.

In addition, the language is less

offensive to the Japanese and the concept represents an approach
which reassesses the U.S. security relationship with Japan.

This

reassessment, analysts argue, should be based on a more dynamic
approach using roles and missions and should be based on
additional foundations for security cooperation, not just threat
perceptions.22
The next chapter will present a more detailed analysis of
burden-sharing as it is currently used, that is, the expansion of
the strategy to include military, trade and finance, and foreign
aid areas.

Although an analysis of the present views may repeat

those stated in the definition, a deeper discussion will clarify
the current burden-sharing debate and hopefully shed some light
concerning future possibilities of and limits to U . S .-Japanese
cooperation.

22 West, "Burden-sharing in the Asia-Pacific: a Partial
Review of the Interim Report of the House Armed Services Panel on
Burdensharing" (U.S. Global Strategy Council, Washington, D.C.,
1989), 5.

CHAPTER 4
ISSUE AREAS, ISSUES AND LINKAGE:
POSSIBILITIES OF AND LIMITS TO U .S .-JAPANESE ADJUSTMENT

The last chapter identified burden-sharing as the major U.S.
approach to maintaining order in a world of shifting
capabilities.

The Japanese approach to stability is based on the

concept of "comprehensive security".

The fundamental difference

between the two approaches is the degree of emphasis placed on
military, economic and foreign aid areas.

The U.S. Congress

continues to emphasize military aspects of cooperation while
Japan focuses on diplomatic and foreign aid areas.

At the root

of the dispute is shifting economic power and current friction in
trade relations.

The following chapter details the U.S. -

Japanese relationship in military, trade and finance, and foreign
aid areas and attempts to show the complex interdependence of the
issues.

MILITARY

Introduction

In the early postwar period, the U.S. and Japan produced a
constitution for Japan and a security treaty.

These two

arrangements effectively transferred responsibility for the
defense of Japan to the U.S.

This act in turn allowed Japan to
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concentrate on its own economic development.1

Even though

factions in Japan allowed its defense industry and Self-Defense
Force to grow, the growth rate was slow so that in the 1980s,
Japan remains dependent upon the U.S.

for its national security.2

The U.S. accepted this reciprocal arrangement where it would
defend Japan and maintain safe sealines of communication in
exchange for base rights and Japan's support of U.S.

foreign

policy.2
Today, the context of this reciprocal arrangement is
changing as U.S. trade and budget deficits are causing Congress
to question the fairness and equity of these arrangements.
Congress states that the

...bottom line to the burden-sharing debate...is how to
guarantee the economic and military security of the United
States and its allies in the 21st century and ensure that
developed countries with mutual defense interests share the
cost of that defense on a more equitable basis and
contribute more equitably to the security, economic and
political well-being of less developed countries 4 ...

1 This strategy is known as the Yoshida Doctrine.
Yoshida,
Prime Minister after V7WII, followed the strategy of economic
development so that eventually Japan would not have to depend on
the U.S. for aid and defense.
2 Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, Defending an Economic
Superpower (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 103.
3 Ibid.
Also, for a good discussion of the "reciprocity"
principle as both a policy and system of patterned behavior which
promotes cooperation, see Robert 0. Keohane1s article
"Reciprocity in International Relation," International
Organization 40, 1 (Winter 1986).
4 House Committee on Armed Services, The Interim Report of
the Defense Burdensharing Panel. 4.
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With this goal in mind, questions arise concerning the U.S.Japanese future relationship.

The three main questions

concerning defense are:

1) Should Japan pay for its own defense?
2) Should Japan share, with the U.S., the cost of defending
itself against foreign aggression?
3) How much military expenditure is enough?

In this section I will outline the main arguments concerning
these questions including the limits to and possibilities of
cooperation.

First,

should Japan pay for its own defense?

Before answering this question,

it is necessary to give some

statistics concerning Japan's defense expenditures,

specifically,

those allocated for 1989 compared to the amount spent in 1988.

Statistics

Currently Japan spends 1.004% of its GNP on defense.

This

amounts to 3.9 trillion yen or $30 billion, one-tenth of total
U.S. defense spending which equals $3 00 billion.5

However, it

does mark a 5.9% increase from 1988 expenditures.

Of the $30

billion, about $16 billion will be spent on "on-the-front"

5 Fallows,
1989): 18.

"Let Them Defend Themselves," The Atlantic (April
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defenses and logistics for Japan's 250,000 man Self-Defense Force
(SDF), a total increase of 16% over 1988.

In addition, about

$1.03 billion, an 18.3% increase over 1988, is set aside for
defense burden-sharing with the U.S..

Specifically, this amount

is targeted towards support for U.S. armed forces in Japan and
maintenance of facilities.
The 1986-90 Mid-Term Defense Plan, the third of such fiveyear plans which began in 1976, attempts to meet the goals set in
197 6 by Takeo M i k i 's National Defense Program Outline.
maintains a budget of $147.2 billion over 5 years.

The plan

It focusses

on improving and expanding Japan's air defenses, anti-submarine
warfare, ground force response to manned invasion, and command,
communications,

intelligence and reconnaissance.6 Japan plans to

deploy domestically designed and manufactured surface-to-air
missiles which could intercept invasion forces far before they
reach the islands.

In addition,

funding for the next generation

fighter support aircraft (the FSX) and an over-the horizon radar
site for defense against long-range Soviet Backfire bombers mark
major changes in Japan's defense policy.7

The new radar site

signals the first time Japan has not purchased a weapon strictly
for its own defense.

The radar will be part of a chain of

6 "Sharing the Defense Burden With Japan: How much is
enough?", 6.
It specifically calls for Japan to purchase 50 P-3 0
anti-submarine warfare patrol aircraft, 63 F-15 fighters, 7 C-13 0
transport aircraft, 6 Patriot surface-to-air missile systems to
replace outdated Nike missiles, 9 destroyers and 5 submarines.
7 Ibid., 8.
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stations beginning in Alaska stretching to the Philippines.8

The

FSX is the first major co-production defense project between
Japan and the U.S..

Thus, much has been done already to meet

"roles and missions" approaches to Japan's defense spending.
These actions will help Japan meet its mission to defend its
sealanes out to 1,000 nautical miles and improve its air
defenses.
Other categories where Japan has made progress in sharing
the responsibility for its defense include: host nation support;
joint planning and maneuvers, defense co-production and
technology transfers, and official development assistance (ODA).9
Under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treat, Japan provides base
facilities for U.S. forces.

They are used for both Japanese

security and forward deployment of U.S. forces into the Asian
Pacific.10

Japan's 1988 defense budget set aside $46,500 for

each of the 55,000 U.S. personnel, which is 40% of the $6 billion
cost of maintaining the forces.11
Despite these statistics which show increased spending by
Japan on its defense, most members of Congress say it is not
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 8-11.
10 Ibid., 8.
11 According to the Interim Report of the Defense
Burdensharina Panel. 63, this figure of $46,500 per U.S.
serviceman is overestimated because it includes such intangibles
as the value of real estate.
With this amount subtracted, the
total spent per serviceman becomes $32,000 which is still higher
than any NATO country's support of U.S. servicemen.
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enough.12

They cite the fact that Japan spends only 1% of its

GNP on defense compared to the U.S.'s 7% GNP as the major
inequality.13

Arguments

a . Linkage

Although groups within the U.S. such as Congress, the
Administration and businesses all support the goal of a stable,
cooperative, bilateral relationship with Japan, they do not agree
on the causes of instability.

The Congressional approach links

the trade deficit to military spending.

Specifically, high U.S.

military expenditures on global security has created the huge
trade deficit.

Japan,

it says, uses the money it saves from its

"free ride" under U.S. security arrangements to become more
competitive in commercial relations which is detrimental to U.S.
industry.

Japan should spend more of its savings on defense.

12 The Burden-sharing panel uses a measurement known as a
state's "ability to contribute".
This includes its population
and GDP shares of the U . S .-Japan-NATO alliance.
Japan, according
to this measurement, is not contributing its "fair" share.
Out
of the total percentage of contributions by the U.S., Japan and
NATO members, Japan contributes 2% of total defense personnel, 3%
of ground forces, 3% of tactical combat aircraft, 3% of naval
ship tonnage, no strategic nuclear warheads and s% of airlift
aircraft.
Ibid., 32.
13 However, one comes to different conclusions when
comparing the amount of Japan's expenditures using NATO's system
of accounting.
Using this system, Japan actually spends, 1.7% of
GNP which is much closer to the amount spent by NATO members.
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This would take resources away from economic competitiveness and
reduce the Japan-U.S. trade gap.

This argument appeals to

domestic interest groups including those that have lost because
of Japanese competition.14
This type of linkage, between issue areas rather than issues
themselves, can be characterized as tactical.15

In order to gain

leverage in the trade dispute, Congress is including defense
spending imbalances as an issue in its argument.

They threaten

that the U.S. may withdraw troops from Japan and let them pay for
their own troops if Japan does not assume more responsibility.
Japan maintains that it is not the lack of military spending on
its part and U.S. overspending which is causing the U.S. to loose
its predominance.

The U.S. budget deficit is ultimately causing

the U.S. trade deficit.

Knowledge concerning the causes of

instability plus differing goals may prevent a cooperative
arrangement.

The Japanese government criticizes the U.S.

Congress for interpreting the common goal of world order to mean
maintaining the status quo, or U.S. hegemony.

Japan, on the

other hand is criticized for its ambivalence toward assuming more
responsibility.

b. Roles and Missions

14 "Sharing the Defense Burden with Japan: How much is
enough?," 5.
15 See Ernst Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and
International Regimes," World Politics (1987): 372.
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The administration approach, although recognizing the
importance of economic shifts and their effects on military
security, does not link security with trade or other economic
issues.

Rather,

it takes a "roles and missions" approach to the

problem which is motivated by strategic concerns.

This "roles

and missions" approach is synonymous with the concept of
"comprehensive security cooperation" rather than "burdensharing".

In other words, cooperation is based on identifying

common interests of military and economic security rather than
unilaterally forcing demands based on quantitative measurements
of fairness and equality.
In a 1981 joint communique between Reagan and then Prime
Minister Suzuki, both emphasized that certain expenditures should
fulfill "mutually acceptable defence goals".16

Thus, defense

spending should be linked to national security needs, not to
budget deficits.

This represents a substantive linkage approach

where most experts believe that military expenditures should be
disbursed according to security interests.17

This type of

linkage could be more conducive to a successful arrangement
because Japan and the U.S. maintain similar national security
interests which are based on a common Soviet threat in Asia.
The roles and missions approach states specifically, that
the U.S. should continue to provide a nuclear deterrent and
16 "Sharing the Defense Burden with Japan: How much is
enough?," 4.
17 For an explanation of substantive linkage, see Haas,
Collaborate? Issue linkage and International Regimes".

"Why

52
offensive strike force in the Northwest Pacific.

Japan should

strengthen its security of territory, coastal waters, airspace
and sealanes 1,000 miles south and east.

Finally, the U.S.

should maintain security commitments to Korea and protect the
sealanes beyond the Northwest Pacific, or, oil routes.18
This argument criticizes Congress' approach to the problem.
First, the argument implies that Congress does not take into
account effects of Soviet activities on U . S .-Japanese security
needs.

Second, there is no proof that increased defense spending

would "hurt" Japan's economy and help the U.S..

Joint research

and development of dual-use technology could actually help both
economies.

In addition, Fiscal and monetary policy plus

microeconomic factors also contribute to the state of the
economy.

Third, defense spending is not zero-sum, that is, Japan

cannot substitute for U.S. military expenditures,
complement them.19

it can only

Costs on both sides are rising and "...the

point is, U.S. resources will also be needed for U.S. tasks.
Both countries will have to continue to do more to meet their
responsibilities".20

Finally, the Congressional approach does

not stipulate exactly how an increase in Japanese expenditures
should be spent.

Thus,

internal disputes regarding U.S.-Japan

18 Larry A. Niksch, "Japan-U.S. Relations in the 1990s,"
Congressional Research Service. 89-264F (7 April 1989): 19.
19 "Sharing the Defense Burden with Japan: How much is
enough?," 5.
20 Ibid.
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defense policies limit the U.S. in its ability to clearly
articulate its demands.
Japan is limited by both domestic and external opinion and
article IX of its constitution which states that Japan will
forever renounce war and the "threat or use of force as a means
of settling international disputes".21

In light of these

constraints, Japan has followed the approach of responding to
U.S. demands one by one rather than taking the initiative in
formulating its own defense policies.

The fact that Japan has

responded to U.S. demands, although in increments, can be seen as
a form of cooperation.

Because trade frictions are so high,

however, Japanese progress on defense is frequently overlooked by
Congress.
In answering the second question, then, Japan is sharing the
burden with the U.S. of defending itself but many argue it is not
enough.

How much is enough, then?

This is a difficult question

to answer considering the various proposals which have been
submitted.
Both the House and the Senate continue to focus on GNP as a
measure of Japan's contribution to cost-sharing.

They drafted a

resolution calling on Japan to spend 3% of its GNP on defense and
to pay a "defense protection fee" or tariff on all goods shipped
to the U.S. which equals the difference between U.S. defense
expenditures and Japanese defense expenditures.22
21 See Japanese constitution.
22 Fallows,

"Let them defend themselves," 17.

Congress makes
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a direct link between the lack of burden-sharing in military
terms and the U.S. trade deficit.
The Department of Defense and the Administration denies this
link and, as stated earlier, emphasizes linkage of defense
expenditures according to national security interests.

These

interests involve a common perception between the U.S. and Japan
of a strong Soviet threat.23

Thus, the question of how much is

enough must be weighed according to this perception plus external
and internal limitations to adjustment.

Possibilities of and Limits to Cooperation

Japan's defense budget has increased from $9.82 billion in
1980 to $30.87 in 1989 at an annual average growth rate of 6%.
Its ability to rapidly increase expenditures, espoused by the
U.S. Congress' 3% target,

is severely limited by national

security needs, the Mutual Security Treaty and public
perceptions.

However, possibilities for cooperation in the

security area exist in the form of increased ODA to strategically
targeted areas,
projects,

defense technology transfers, joint development

increased host nation support, and dual technology.24

23 West, Burdensharing in the Asia-Pacific: A Partial Review
of the Interim Report of the House Armed Services Panel on
Burdensharing. 7.
24 Dower in "Dual-use Technology", discusses spin-off and
spin-on effects of dual technology.
Technology developed for
commercial use by Japan can produce "spin-on" effects which
contribute to the joint development of defense technology.
Defense technology can also have "spin-off" effects, contributing
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Despite current criticism that Japan is not spending enough on
its own defense, a closer look at the facts indicates that Japan
has markedly increased its defense spending and plans to continue
the increase at a 5-6% annual rate.25
It is apparent that until the trade deficit is balanced or
improved dramatically, Congress will continue to focus on the
military "burden-sharing" debate as a way to achieve cooperation
in the trade dispute.

to higher technology for commercial use.
These effects are
thought to benefit both the U.S. and Japan economically and
militarily.
25 See N ikshe1 Japan-U.S. Relations in the 1990s.
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TRADE AND FINANCE

The

U . S .-Japanese interdependent relationship in trade and

finance is also undergoing a transformation.

The past

asymmetries, where Japan was dependent upon the U.S. for both an
open market and continuous supply of dollars, are shifting.
Today, the U.S. depends on Japan to finance its budget deficit
and on a market for its goods.

Statistics

In 1988, trade between Japan and the U.S. equalled $13 0.6
billion.

The U.S. is Japan's number one trading partner while

Japan is the U.S.'s number two partner.

Japan is a major market

for U.S. agricultural products, raw materials like wood, and U.S.
aircraft.

Japan is the major supplier of automobiles, consumer

electronics, telecommunications equipment and computers to the
U . S . .26
In 1985, Japan became the world's largest creditor nation
while the U.S. became the world's largest debtor.

Japan is

a

major investor in the U.S., purchasing $136 billion worth of U.S.
government securities to finance the U.S. budget deficit,

$10.6

billion worth of U.S. stock and directly investing up to $23.4
billion in manufacturing, retailing and service industries.27
26 See Nikshe's, Japan-U.S. Relations in the 1990s.
27 Ibid.

In
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the early 1980s Japan decided to support the U.S. financially in
order to create a market for its exports and because of high U.S.
interest rates.28

However, as Gilpin points out, "...in the long

run, political concerns and interests will determine the
willingness of Japan to continue financial support of American
hegemony and prosperity".29
Although these figures indicate a form of interdependence
and cooperation, the main statistic, the U.S. $53.8 billion trade
deficit with Japan, represents the source of the current U.S.Japanese friction.

The trade deficit has increased from $19.3

billion in 1982 to $55.7 billion in 1988.

This condition has

spurred the U.S. Congress to pressure Japan to open its markets
to foreign goods.

Arguments

a. U.S. Congress

Burden-sharing in terms of trade demands that the actors
"play fair" by maintaining the free market system based on
unimpeded competition.

The U.S. accuses Japan of restricting

foreign access to its markets, dumping, government intervention
in the form of subsidies and export credits and structural
28 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 338.
29 Ibid.
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impediments such as its tax and distribution systems.

Thus,

Japan, they say, is not playing by the rules or according to a
"level playing field".30 They are protecting their own industries
from foreign competition and at the same time are benefiting from
the free market system.31
U.S.

These obstacles have prevented the

from increasing its exports and, in turn, foreign exchange

earnings.

Without more foreign exchange, the U.S. has been

unable to bridge the trade gap with Japan and its own budget
deficit.

Because of these changes, the U.S. is demanding that

Japan operate according to the principle of "reciprocity".32
This U.S. demand has sparked a debate over whether to employ
the "reciprocity" approach or a "national treatment" policy,
"reciprocity" suggests that American companies in Japan should be
treated in exactly the same way as Japanese companies are treated
in the United States.

Or, because the U.S. maintains free

markets, so should Japan.

"National treatment" implies that

businesses operating in a foreign country will be subject to that
states laws and rules, thus preserving the sovereignty of each
state.

b. Japan
30 Clyde H. Farnsworth, "U.S. Cites Japan, India and Brazil
as Unfair Traders," New York Times. (26 May 1989).
31 James Fallows,
1989) : 44 .

"Containing Japan," The Atlantic (May

32 See Keohane's "reciprocity and International Relations"
for explanations of specific and diffuse reciprocity.
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Japan maintains that the U.S. cannot compete with them in
terms of product quality, service and price.

Further, the U.S.,

they say, is preoccupied with keeping its hegemonic position in
the international system, not fair competition.33

The U.S. has

imposed quotas and tariffs on Japanese products, so how can the
government espouse free market principles?

In addition, the U.S.

has not seriously confronted the budget deficit problem.

Instead

of using Japanese success as a target for criticism, the U.S.
should improve its own economy and competitiveness.

Instead of

focussing on short-term planning and profits, U.S. businessmen
should plan according to long-term goals of creating a strong
competitive base through improved productivity and technology.

U.S., Japanese Approaches to the Trade Disputes

Since the 1985 Plaza accord, when the G-7 agreed to
stabilize foreign exchange rates, the U.S. has tried to reduce
the trade deficit in two ways.

First, its macroecnomic policy

supported a low dollar and high yen in order to increase exports
and force the Japanese economy to become more import-oriented.
However, this policy has not achieved short-term success.
Although U.S. exports have risen, so have Japanese exports to the
U.S., especially of capital goods.

Second, U.S.'s microeconomic

33 Hobart Rowen, "The U.S. Should Accept the idea of sharing
power with Japan," The Washington Post (23 October 1988).
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policy favored sector-by-sector negotiations with Japan in the
semi-conductor, telecommunications and automobile parts
industries in order to gain entry to Japan of products where the
U.S. has a competitive edge.

This approach has also failed to

improve the U.S. trade imbalance.34
Because of the apparent failure of these approaches,
President Bush outlined a new approach in June of 1989, known as
the "structural impediments initiative"

(SII).

This new approach

is designed to force Japan to eliminate invisible market barriers
to trade and finance.

These include: rotation of contracts among

Japanese construction firms3 5 , manufacturing companies' strong
control over suggested retail prices, and differences in the
price of manufactured goods in and outside the U.S.36

Structural

adjustments in Japan include altering customary business
practices such as the "Keiretsu", a system of interlocking
shareholdings.

In the U.S., adjustments include altering the

social systems such as education and labor-management as a way to
open markets and to promote international competitiveness.37
However, the method of achieving these adjustments is still
unclear.
34 Sumio Kido and Yuko Inoue, "U.S. trade focus blurs big
picture," Japan Economic Journal 2 6 June 1989.
35 This system is known as "dango".
36 Sumio Kido and Yuko Inoue,
Picture."
37 Ibid.

"U.S. Trade Focus Blurs Big
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Another approach, this time initiated by Congress with
much less support from the president,
"results oriented" where the U.S.
to improve the trade deficit.

is characterized as

is seeking more direct measures

Passage of the Super 3 01 clause of

the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 give Congress
and the U.S. Trade Representative more direct influence in trade
disputes.

The clause transfers authority from the President to

the U.S. Trade Representative

(USTR) to determine if a foreign

trade practice meets section 301 criteria for action.38

It also

transfers the authority to the USTR to determine what action,

if

any, to take and to implement the action.39
Thus, USTR Carla Hills labelled Japan an "unfair" trading
partner through its inclusion as a priority country on the "super
301" list.

If Japan does not eliminate import barriers within 18

months on supercomputer, communications satellites and forest
products, the U.S. will be forced to take retaliatory,

including

sanctions up to 100% tariffs, measures against Japan.

The

transfer of power was partly the result of trade policy critics
who complained that the President "had not used his section 301
authority sufficiently and that our trade partners had been able
to block U.S. exports with impunity".40

The transfer also allows

38 William H. Cooper et al. CRS Report for Congress: The
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. 88-390E
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1 September
1988): 7.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 6.
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the USTR to act with less influence from non-trade Presidential
advisors.

There is a feeling in Congress, then, that the U.S. is

finally "getting tough" with the Japanese by setting demands and
time limits for settlement of disputes. Others criticize
action claiming it could lead

the

to further protectionist measures.

The Japanese reaction to the decision was extremely
critical.

Former Prime Minister Sosuke Uno stated the trade

imbalance in Japan's favor is partly due to the huge U.S.
deficit.

budget

Based on these assumptions, he argues that;

...the implementation of the super 301 provision is an
attempt to divert attention from the major cause of the
trade imbalance and to eschew the responsibilities of the
U.S. in macro economic policies.41

U n o 1s Trade Minister, Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, summed up Japan's view
saying that the U.S.'s unilateral decision is "extremely
regrettable" and could adversely affect multilateral talks in the
Uruguay round of GATT.42

He continued;

...Japan will voluntarily rectify its trade system if
necessary as a nation who benefited most from the
multilateral free trade system in the world...If we
recognize the need to discuss particular trade issues, we
will be ready to talk at the GATT but not in the pretext of
unilateral trade sanctions of the U.S. based on that
country's law...my understanding is that the U.S. is only
trying to put its trade law into practice.43
41 FBIS, EAS-89-101,
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 2.

26 May 1989 Kvodo, 26 May 1989, 1.
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In addition, businessmen in the computer, satellite and lumber
industries stated that they do not unfairly protect their
industries.

They cited import growth in these areas as evidence

of increasing trade liberalization.44 Although some

U.S.

Congressmen admit that Japan has been cooperating by honoring
trade agreements, they complain that Japan is not complying fast
enough.

Thus, one motivation for citing Japan as an "unfair"

trading partner was to force Japan to quicken its pace toward
liberalization.

Possibilities of and Limits to Cooperation

Currently, Japan refuses to conduct bilateral negotiations
under the threat of retaliation and says that the U.S. action
could hurt multilateral talks concerning free-trade.45

In the

short term, then Congress' approach may limit mutual adjustment.
The Japanese preferred the previous bilateral sectoral approach
to negotiations.

The U.S., however,

is trying to gain leverage

by linking "as many complex disputes as possible at the same
time".46

This tactical approach is likely to succeed only if

44 Ibid., 4.
45 Stuart Auerbach, "Japan Cited by Bush as Unfair Trader,"
The Washington Post 26 May 1989, A14.
46 Richard A. Gephart, "Great Necessities Call Out Great
Virtues," Vital Speeches of The Day vol. IV, no. 15 (15 May
1989): 450.
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Japan perceives greater benefits by complying and greater costs,
that is less market access,

by not agreeing to this approach.

Statistics show that the trade surplus is worsening rather
than improving.47

Although Japan and the U.S. have made progress

in trade disputes concerning telecommunications and in
agricultural products, the Congress and some businesses continue
to criticize Japan's structural impediments in trade.

Japan

faults the U.S. for its current trade deficit, citing its
unwillingness to improve the budget deficit.

According to Larry

Niksche's CRS report:
...Economic relations between the United States and Japan
will continue to be a key challenge and probably the key
challenge to the relationship in the 1990s.
Present
tensions over trade imbalances, market access, and
investment flows are certain to persist.
They undoubtedly
will affect the political and security aspects of the
relationship.
The future of the relationship will depend
on the ability of the U.S. and Japanese governments to
contain economic frictions and, especially, to limit the
"spillover" effects.4®
Most experts agree that Japanese economic power, based on new
methods of production and advanced technology, will expand into
the 21st century at a rate equal to or faster than that of the
U.S.49
In addition to an increased trade deficit, trade disputes

47 See Direction of Trade Statistics for trends.
48 Larry Niksch,

"Japan-U.S. relations in the 1990s," 4.

49 The Washington Times. 3 January 1989, 4.
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are likely to continue.50

By following the Structural

Impediments Initiative and a tactical issue-linkage approach to
negotiations, the U.S. will continue to conceive burden-sharing
in terms of trade.

That is, by negotiating a reduction of these

barriers, the U.S. hopes to entice Japan to play according to the
rules of a "level playing field" and help the trade imbalance by
importing more U.S. goods.

However, others argue that passage of

the super 301 may promote protectionist trade practices and lead
the international system away from liberalism.51
The trade dispute also has implications for the U.S. as a
financial leader.

According to Robert Gilpin, the current trade

discord is a result of the Reagan Administration's defense
buildup and fiscal policy.52

In order to finance the huge

increase, the Federal Reserve increased interest rates attracting
foreign, that is Japanese, purchasing of U.S. treasury bonds.
Reagan's policy of low taxes coupled with a low U.S. savings rate
placed the role of financing the U.S. military buildup on
Japan.53
In the long-run, however, Japan's willingness to continue
financial support of U.S.

interests may decline, causing the

economic power and influence of the U.S. to fall even more.
50 Ibid.
51 Auerbach,

"Japan Cited by Bush as Unfair Trader," A14.

52 Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations.
330-332.
53 Ibid.
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Thus, the key measurements of power are shifting from military to
trade and financial capabilities.

The U.S. ability to act as a

lender of last resort is in jeopardy.
assume responsibility is questionable.

Whether or not Japan can
However, one area where

Japan is creating a larger role for itself in terms of financial
support is foreign aid.

67
FOREIGN AID

Introduction

The majority of Japanese policy-makers believe "because we
cannot dramatically increase our defense spending, we should use
our aid policy as a diplomatic card to head off possible
pressures from the Western allies".54

Japan is now the world's

largest ODA donor, next to the U.S., dispersing up to $10 billion
annually to less developed countries (LDCs).

This fact has been

overlooked by many because of criticism focused on trade and
defense imbalances.

In the past,

foreign aid was one area where

Japan and the U.S. have cooperated in "aid policy
coordination".55

Thus, it provides an area where Japan can

answer current burden-sharing demands.

Because Japan is still

dependent on LDCs for natural resources such as energy and food
and also as a market for Japanese goods,
dependent upon these countries.

it is vulnerably

In addition,

its relationship

with the West has forced Japan to be concerned with states of
geopolitical importance.56
54 Opposition parties are against such a policy and would
establish a new government agency and a law regulating ODA
spending. See "LDP, Opposition Disagree on Use of Aid," The Japan
Economic Journal, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
25 May 1989.
55 William L. Brooks and Robert M. Orr, Jr., "Japan's
Foreign Economic Assistance," Asian Survey, vol. XXV, no. 3,
(March 1985): 322.
56 Ibid., 322.
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Definition: Official Development Assistance

Official development assistance is given both bilaterally
through Japanese public and private institutions such as the
Export-Import Bank of Japan, the Overseas Economic Cooperation
Fund (OECF), and the Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA) and multilaterally through the World Bank, International
Development Agency and the Asian Development Bank.
contains grant and loan elements.

Bilateral grant aids include

economic development and other assistance,
cooperation.

Each type

food aid and technical

Multilateral grants go to the UN, UN agencies and

to international development agencies.
through the OECF and Ex-Im Bank.

Japan's loans are given

Multilateral loans are given

through the World Bank and the International Development Agency
(IDA).

Background

Initially, Japan's foreign aid programs were commercially
oriented, with no underlying philosophy or policy objectives.57
From 1950 to 1965 Japan conducted reparations negotiations with
Southeast Asian nations, such as the Philippines and Indonesia,
which were occupied by Japan during WWII.

Japan benefited

commercially by tying aid to "procurement" from Japan which
57 Ibid., 323.
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established financial institutions and opened markets for
Japanese goods in Southeast Asia.

From the mid 1950s-1970s, aid

was excessively tied and used to promote exports.

After joining

the exclusive OECD as the first non-Western state, Japan was
increasingly subjected to pressures from other states within the
organization and from the Third World to untie its aid.58
In 1972 it began to untie its multilateral aid and in 1975,
focused on untying bilateral aid.

In the 1970s, mainly because

of the Arab oil embargo, Japan conducted "resource diplomacy",
directing its aid to resource-rich countries for large-scale
resource development or industrial projects.

Also, because of

the Iranian Revolution, the invasion of Afghanistan and
Kampuchea, and the slowing down of the world economy, Japan
started linking its aid to security interests.59

Thus, under the

concept of "comprehensive security", Japan sought to integrate
diplomatic, aid and defense efforts into a foreign policy frame
work designed to meet its own as well as Western security
interests.60

Because of military limitations, policy-makers

decided to use economic assistance as a major foreign policy
tool.

They thought that providing enough foreign aid to

countries of strategic, geopolitical interest would promote
stability and prevent external intervention.61
58 Ibid., 325.
59 Ibid., 326.
60 Ibid., 327.
61 Ibid., 326.
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By 1980, Japan was providing $3 billion annually in ODA,
double that of 1978, and was planning another doubling of ODA.
Although Japan gives most of its ODA to the ASEAN states under
the concept of comprehensive security,

its program increasingly

includes assistance tied less excessively to large-scale,
capital-intensive projects and more to the economic development
of LDCs in Latin America and Subsahara Africa.

The main portion

of its aid has been and will continue to be disbursed throughout
A s i a .62

Japan's ODA Statistics

Japan gives economic assistance to 13 4 developing countries.
Currently it is the second largest donor among Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development members after the U.S.

From

1965 to 1988, Japan's ODA increased from about $244 million to
$10 billion.

From 1982 to 1987, 1988 Japanese ODA increased from

$3,023 billion to $8.8 and $10 billion respectively.63
Although guantitative increases in ODA show a trend toward
Japan assuming a leadership role in the foreign aid area, other
indicators remain below the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) average.

Japan's ODA/GNP ratio was .29% in 1987 which was

62 See Japan's Economic Planning Agency's 1988-92 Five Year
Economic Plan.
63 Much of this increase is due to the rise in value of the
yen.
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below the DAC average of .3 6%.64

Finally, the DAC average is

well below the United Nations-recommended level of .7%.65

Arguments

a. Aid Philosophy

An argument between the U.S. and Japan relating to ODA
concerns Japan's aid philosophy.

The U.S. says that it does not

have a real philosophy except to promote exports.

Japan,

however, explains it does have an overall approach which includes
three main principles: self-reliance among recipient countries
("request only"), an apolitical stance on the part of the donor,
and combining of public and private efforts to promote
development.66

According to Barbara Stallings,

"these factors

lead to a reluctance to impose bilateral conditionality on loans
and to a lack of enthusiasm for economic lending on strategic
grounds, both of which have been criticized by the U.S.
government".67

.35%,

64 Japan's ODA/GNP ratios from 1982 to 1986 were .28%,
.29% and .29% respectively.

65 Eilleen M. Doherty, "Japan's foreign aid policy:
Update," Japan Economic Institute 41A, 3 0 October 1987.

.33%,

1987

66 Barbara Stallings, "An Increased Japanese Role in Third
World Development," Policy Focus, no. 6, (1988): 5.
67 Ibid.
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Japan's "request only" policy appears to show non
interference in the domestic policies of other states.

However,

it is also used as a selective instrument which promotes Japanese
technical assistance and trade.

Under this policy the four

ministries which guide Japanese ODA policy, The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

(MFA), The Ministry of International Trade and

Investment (MITI), The Economic Planning Agency (EPA), and The
Ministry of Finance (MOF) set annual aid targets to LDCs and
handle recipient project requests, developed with the Japanese
private sector.

Each request is handled on a case-by-case basis

under the Yon Shocho system.68

The new five-year economic plan

states that Japan is moving away from "request-only" to a more
aggressive approach.69
Recent events show that Japan is reconsidering its past
apolitical stance by withholding its 97 billion yen loan to China
in light of the current political unrest.70

In addition, Japan's

major participation in the Multilateral Assistance Initiative for
the Philippines, which includes $6-10 billion to be disbursed
over a five-year period beginning in 1990,

indicates that

strategic interests with the West are involved.71

Japan's aid

68 David Arase, paper presented at the annual International
Studies Association conference, 1989 London.
69 See Five-year Economic Plan.
70 See Foreign Broadcast Information Service daily report,
the first time Japan has severely criticized China for its actions.
71 "Donors hope aid will stabilize Philippines," The Japan
Economic Journal. 10 June 1989.
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philosophy is changing to meet its own interests, including
increased trade opportunities, and its security interests with
the West.

b. Allocation

The U.S. and the international lending organizations
criticize Japan's uneven disbursements of ODA.

Japan allocates

most of its ODA to Asian countries for historical, geographic,
economic and political reasons.72

By the end of the 1970s,

Japan's 7-1-1-1 formula for aid allocation was
institutionalized.73

This meant that 70% of its ODA went to Asia

while 10% each went to Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.
Recent actions, however,
with non-Asian areas.

indicate that Japan is concerned

In 1988 It set up a "special fund" of $2

billion within the World Bank for improved development of
Subsahara Africa.

It also increased its ODA to strategic

countries like Oman, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey and technical
assistance to the Middle East to help facilitate the passage of
ships in the Persian Gulf.

Thus, Japan uses ODA to maintain

security in non-Asian as well as Asian areas.

Finally, Japan's

involvement in Latin America is not rapidly expanding in terms of
ODA disbursement, yet the debt problem spurred its trade surplus
recycling initiative.

This initiative, announced in 1987, is

72 Orr, 328.
73 Dougherty,

"Japan's foreign aid policy:

1987 Update," 7.
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intended to divert $20 billion to debtor nations with $4 billion
targeted to Latin America.74

Despite these increases, the U.S.

says that it is still not enough.
Proposals by Japanese suggest that rather than Japan trying
to eliminate its trade surplus,
to developing countries.

it should send more excess funds

Specifically,

it should recycle $25

billion annually to the LDCs over a five-year period and should
triple the 1985 ODA figure by 1990.

A proposal by the U.S.

Senate included an amendment to the Defense Department
authorization bill calling on Japan to increase its ODA/GNP ratio
to 3% by 1992.75

The current percentage is .29, making this

request highly unfeasible considering the amount of ODA Japan has
already pledged.

Despite increased ODA to non-Asian areas, Japan

will most likely continue to focus its aid on Asia because of
trade opportunities, cultural ties and a greater knowledge of the
area.

c. Aid Quality

Another source of tension between the U.S. and Japan is the
amount of grants and loans contained in Japan's ODA.

Ideally,

ODA should be "untied" to the purchase of goods and in the form
of grants with a greater emphasis on social infrastructure.

In

74 Michelle Rockier, "Japan Funneling $30 billion to Third
World," Times of the Americas 21 September 1988, 13.
75 Dougherty, 7.
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the past, Japan has focused on tying its ODA loans to the
purchase of expensive equipment for capital-intensive projects,
actions which contradict DAC requirements.76

Although Japan has

directly untied its ODA, many argue that it remains indirectly
tied to the engineering portion of aid.

That is, because Japan

requires feasibility studies from the recipient before a project
is accepted, this requirement forces the recipient to rely on
Japanese consultants.77

These consultants can then influence the

project to be developed and the type of equipment to be used,
usually Japanese.
On the surface, the past few years, however, show a trend
that Japan is increasing its role in Third World development
according to the principles of international development
institutions.

Japan's grant share of ODA has increased, terms of

loans have been softened,

less money has gone to large-scale

projects, tying has declined well below the DAC average, and more
funds have been targeted for the least developed countries.78
On the other hand, a closer look indicates that Japan
intends to continue to focus its ODA in Asia, encouraging more
imports,

foreign direct investment and ODA.

year economic plan links ODA,
76 Stallings,
Committee.

5.

Japan's 1988 five

investment and trade under the

DAC refers to the Development Assistance

77 Usually, LDCs in Asia do not have the expertise that
Japan does, but in other areas of the world this is not true.e.g.
in Subsaraha Africa and Latin America.
78 Trends can be found by analyzing Development Cooperation
annual reports.
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concept of "comprehensive economic cooperation".79

Instead of

following the "request-only" policy, the plan indicates that
Japan will take a greater initiative by making country-by-country
aid plans, helping LDCs draw up their own development plans and
will invite Korea and Taiwan to implement aid programs.80

d. Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid

In its bilateral relationship with Japan, the U.S. has urged
Japan to give more ODA for strategic reasons.

On the other hand,

the U.S. has asked Japan to contribute more to the World Bank and
IMF according to their principles.

Thus, Japan is being

pressured to fulfill two roles, that of an "ally" to the West and
as a world leader promoting development and stability.
In both instances, as stated in chapter two, Japan is
concerned with its reputation and credibility within the
international system.

Japan has given more for strategic reasons

in order to maintain a credible partnership with the West.
addition,

In

it has increased its multilateral ODA to promote the

image of a "Japan which contributes to the world" through
peaceful means compared to its past militaristic reputation.
In theory, strategic considerations should not be a factor
in multilateral ODA allocations.

In practice, however, two

factors serve to conceal this distinction.
79 Takeshita,
80 Arase,

11.

3.

First, countries
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labelled both as LDCs and which are strategically important to
U . S .-Japanese security interests can receive multilateral ODA
under the guise of "development".

Second, the U . S .-Japanese

bilateral relationship is also reflected in multilateral
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Although these
institutions are supposed to be apolitical,

it is almost

impossible to ignore the self-interests of the actors who
influence policy.
A central argument concerning bilateral versus multilateral
aid maintains that, according to the U.S., Japanese bilateral ODA
should have a balanced combination of both private and
governmental contributions.
more ODA,

If the governmental agencies give

it less likely to be tied to commercial interests

compared to grants and loans given by the private sector.
Currently, however, most of Japan's ODA is given by the private
sector because that is where the surplus is generated.
government budget is actually running a deficit.

The

Despite this

predicament, Japan is continuing to search for cooperation on
debt and development between the government and private sector.81
In line with this argument, the U.S. continues to demand
that Japan give more to multilateral development institutions.
Despite the fact that Japan is now the number one donor,
quantitatively, of ODA compared to DAC members

the U.S. cites

81 Saburo Okita, "Japanese Aid Policy and The Recycling of
the Surplus for Development," Draft (March 1988): 13.
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the fact that Japan spends only .29% of its GNP on ODA compared
to the DAC average of .3 6%.82
Another issue involves increased quotas from Japan to the
World Bank.

Specifically, Japan has increased its quota from

17,539 shares in 1980 to 52,626 in 1988.

At the same time,

its

voting power, a reflection of its quota in the Bank, has
increased from 5.30% in 1980 to 6.65% in 1988.83

The voting

power of the U.S., on the other hand, has declined from 21.11% in
1980 to 18.72% in 1988.

Because of its trade and budget

deficits, the U.S. is contributing less and less.
Despite this trend, the U.S. does not want to lose its
hegemonic position in the World Bank.

Thus, in December of 1986,

the U.S. negotiated an agreement with Japan which would allow the
U.S. to retain veto power over major policy changes, a privilege
it has enjoyed since the founding of the organization.84
return, Japan could increase its voting power.85
allowed the veto

The

In

agreement

threshold to be lowered from 2 0% to 15%

where

country with over a 15% voting power, that is the U.S., may
82 List DAC members
83 Japan is now ahead of France (4.93%), Germany (5.14%) and
the U.K. (4.93%) in terms of voting power.
84 Creating
"special funds" like Japan's contributions to
Subsahara Africa through the World Bank will likely continue.
Since Japan is apprehensive about taking responsibility within
the WB, it can still answer demands that it contribute more
without dramatically increasing its voting power by using such
instruments as "special funds" which do not affect voting power.
85 "U.S. to reduce voting power in World Bank" Wall Street
Journal. (16 December 1986).
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exercise the veto.

Despite this agreement, Japan argues that its

voting power within both the World Bank and the IMF is not an
accurate reflection of the amount of money it contributes to
these organizations.
The U.S. cites Japanese inexperience in decision-making and
lack of technical knowledge as reasons why Japanese influence
should remain low.

However, Japan's willingness to act as the

world's largest creditor within international organizations
without commensurate political influence will not last
indefinitely.

These shifting power relations within the World

Bank and IMF are a reflection of wider shifting capabilities
within the international system.86
the U.S.

For the time being, however,

is still able to significantly influence agreements

within the World Bank and IMF.

Summary

Four trends in aid philosophy, allocation, quality and
bilateral versus multilateral aid can be drawn from the previous
analysis.

First, most believe that Japan's aid philosophy is

leading away from the "request only" approach to one which
requires initiative and more government-private sector
cooperation by Japan.

The U.S. wants Japan to increase its ODA

through government funds because it is less likely to be tied to

86 See Krasner's International Regimes. 15 for explanation
of power as a variable which causes regimes to change.
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trade and finance.

However, since the trade surplus is generated

within the private sector, it is inevitable that this money will
be used for increased ODA.

Second, on the whole, Japan's aid

will continue to focus on Asia and to those of strategic
importance while Japan continues to give aid to the World Bank to
improve its reputation and credibility.

While the U.S. supports

Japanese ODA to the WB and IDA, it does not want to cede the
accompanying "power-sharing" privileges to Japan.
the U.S.

In addition,

fears that Japanese concentration of ODA in Asia will

create a powerful Asian co-prosperity bloc in terms of trade and
finance.

Third, Japan's aid, although directly untied,

indirectly tied.

is

LDCs , especially in Asia, are dependent on

Japan for technical assistance to produce the required
feasibility study.

Therefore, along with allocating Japanese ODA

more evenly, the U.S. supports both directly and indirectly
untied aid in order to prevent this bloc in which Japan would be
the major trading and financial power.
Fourth, Regarding the bilateral versus multilateral aid
choice, Japan will likely give more through both channels because
it has the money.

However,

it will continue to give more

bilateral than multilateral because of business opportunities
which will benefit trade.
Based on mutual interests, Japan, as a response to U.S.
burden-sharing demands, has answered requests to increase its
strategic aid.

Using strategic aid as a means of fulfilling

military contributions to burdensharing provides an example where
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issue linkage is used to achieve cooperation.

However, the issue

of power-sharing, especially in international organizations,

is

emerging as another concern which the U.S. must inevitably
confront.

CONCLUSION

The previous analysis of military, trade and finance, and
foreign aid attempts to outline the dilemmas and approaches to
their resolution produced by the changing U . S .-Japanese
interdependent relationship.

Variables such as power,

interests

and culture are transforming the arrangements created after WWII.
Although in the past these arrangements have guided state
behavior, maintaining a cooperative relationship, one could argue
that the current discord is the result of uncertainty produced by
a relatively declining hegemon, the U.S., and a slowly emerging
power, Japan, which has yet to assume economic leadership.

CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS FOR U .S .-JAPANESE COOPERATION:
JAPAN'S FUTURE ROLE RECONSIDERED
After introducing the concepts of interdependence and
cooperation, the previous analysis focused on the changing U.S.Japanese relationship.

Chapter two answered questions concerning

Japan's future world role in relation to its past and to other
states.

It shows the constraining effects of uncertainty,

misperceptions and ill-defined interests on forming world roles.
Chapter three examined the concept of burden-sharing developed by
the U.S. as a policy to deal with its inability to maintain
overseas commitments.

Development of policy on both sides to

address the effects of shifting capabilities and to define future
roles are often misguided because of problems of uncertainty,
perceptions and misperceptions.
Chapter four examined in detail the U . S .-Japanese
interdependent relationship in areas of military, trade and
finance, and foreign aid.

These areas are interlinked, sometimes

forming channels for cooperation, or mutual adjustment, and other
times conflict.

For instance,

in burden-sharing,

linking demands

for increased Japanese military spending to the trade dispute has
created more discord than cooperation. On the other hand, linking
Japan's wealth to demands that it increase its foreign aid
contributions as a form of burden-sharing has been more
successful in terms of cooperation.
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UNCERTAINTY AND COOPERATION?

From the present U.S.-Japan interdependent relationship,

it

is apparent that uncertainty promotes conflict while leaving open
the possibilities for cooperation.

However, the U.S.'s past

relationship with Japan was much more predictable, enabling
policies to adjust to mutual expectations.

Under what

circumstances, then, does uncertainty promote cooperation?

Some

argue that because the U.S., as the dominant world power, was
able to influence Japan, a powerless state,

into accepting formal

treaties, this guaranteed certain state behavior in line with
U.S.

interests.

Thus, the uncertainty created after WWII was

modified by the hegemonic leadership of the U.S.. This leadership
promoted a form of cooperation, not based on equality, but on the
distribution of power.
Although the U.S. was the dominant military and economic
power, both sides benefited from the relationship.

The U.S.

benefited from the security of Japan as a political and
ideological ally.

Japan profited from the U.S. security system

and U.S. leadership in foreign policy which enabled them to
concentrate on economic development.
Now, due to shifting capabilities, this order seems to be
threatened.

As Japan's wealth increases and U.S. influence

waivers, perceived interests are changing.

Many Japanese claim

that the U.S. is only concerned with maintaining its hegemonic
role in the world.

Others believe that Japanese rhetoric, which

attempts to portray it as a nation pursuing peace through
economic diplomacy, only masks their true intentions of becoming
the world's dominant economic power.
The current uncertainty about interests and intentions and
the resulting instability can only be rectified, according to
some, through continued support of the U.S. as the world leader
in trade,

finance and defense.1

Japan is constrained because of

its diplomatic inexperience and little knowledge of other
cultures.

In addition, Japan does not have the ability to act as

a lender of last resort, to maintain open markets and to make and
enforce the rules of the international economic system as the
U.S. did.
On the other hand, stability of the international system may
not depend on the leadership of the U.S. or Japan as a hegemon.
Although the leadership of a single state, based on the
distribution of power,

is important in maintaining stability,

cooperation can occur by adhering, rationally, to international
regimes.2

Today the burden of assuming hegemonic leadership at

the previous U.S. level is too great for any one state raising
the importance of international regimes in facilitating mutual
adjustments.
FACTORS INFLUENCING JAPAN'S FUTURE WORLD ROLE
1 Samuel P. Huntington has expressed this view repeatedly.
See his article "The U.S.-Decline or Renewal?," Foreign Affairs
(1989) .
2 Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the
World Political Economy. 63-64.
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The U . S .-Japanese relationship directly relates to the
stability of the world system because of the enormous economic
and military power of the two combined.

Therefore, although the

previous chapters emphasized their bilateral relationship,

I will

here draw some conclusions concerning Japan's future world role.
To restate, the four future scenarios developed by contemporary
theorists are; Pax Americana II, Joint Hegemony, Pax Consortium
and Pax Nipponica.
In military, economic and foreign aid terms both external
and internal factors will shape Japan's future world role.
Externally, perceptions of Japan's dramatic increase in wealth,
the trend towards regionalism and perceptions of military threats
will inevitably shape its future character.

Internally,

governmental instability, changing domestic views of its future
role, and cultural values will affect domestic and foreign policy
designed to achieve a new role.

External Influences

As stated earlier, a state's own perceptions and those of
others are important in defining interests and policies.
Regional and global perceptions of Japan's growing economic power
constrains its ability to become the "balancer among the
continental powers".

Past fears among Korea, China and other

Asian states of Japan's attempt to create a Greater Co-prosperity
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Sphere in Asia still prevail.

In addition, the U.S. still views

Japan's rise in power with caution.

The possibility of its

economic power translating into military power could conceivably
allow Japan to replace the U.S. as the world's hegemon.
U.S., therefore,

The

is demanding that Japan, as its traditional

ally, share the burden of its overseas commitments.

This policy

is designed to maintain the U.S. as world leader both
economically and military while at the same time limiting Japan's
threat to U.S. economic security.

The trend towards

regionalism has also raised concerns about the effects on the
world trading system.

Will the economic integration of the EEC

in 1992 and the development of the U.S.-Canada free-trade pact
lead the international system away from liberalism towards
protectionism?

Because Japan is uncertain as to whether or not

these trading blocs will erect tariffs and quotas on outside
imports,

it is seeking to protect its own economic security by

increasing trade and financial flows within the Asia Pacific
region.
Another reason why it is turning to its own region as a
source of economic security includes the consequences of U.S.
attempts to balance its own budget.

According to the Japanese,

these measures will decrease U.S. ability to import goods, which
would negatively affect Japan since it is the U.S.'s number two
trading partner next to Canada.

In addition, because Japanese

influence depends solely on its economic power,

fear of this

influence decreasing has forced Japan to focus its ODA on Asia.
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Allocating more loans and grants denominated in Yen to Asian
states will force them to purchase goods in Yen, further
integrating this currency and trade within the region.

As Japan

shifts production offshore to cut rising production costs this
also integrates trade and financial relations.
However, the perception factor also plays a role in limiting
Japan's economic dominance in the Asian region.

The "Four

Dragons", Hongkong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, and the
"new NICs", Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, do
not support a "Yen blo c " .3

They want increased trade with Japan

to complement the U.S. market.4
approach,

Based on historical fears, this

in their view, would limit the possibility of Japan

forcefully dominating the region through its economic and
potential military power.

The Japanese are aware of these

sentiments and have no desire to portray themselves as an
aggressive nation.

They are trying to balance their own economic

interests with interests of other states.

They have slowly

answered U.S. demands that Japan liberalize trade barriers, while
at the same time covering its bases by increasing trade ties in
its own region.
Continued perceptions of a Soviet military threat are also
shaping Japan's future world role.
answer

They have forced Japan to

U.S. demands to take a greater responsibility for its own

3 "The Yen Block: A New Balance in Asia?," The Economist (15
July 1989): 6.
4 Ibid.
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defense as the U.S. can no longer shoulder the burden alone.
With modest increases in the defense budget, Japan is appeasing
U.S. demands.

At the same time, however,

it must be careful not

to arouse fears among its Asian neighbors of a resurgent
militaristic Japan.

Thus, Japan is balancing foreign interests

based on perceptions of Japanese intentions with its own economic
interests.

Internal influences

Factors such as domestic instability, changing views of its
future role and cultural values influence policy-making.
Within the last year, Japan has elected four different
governments because of scandal.

From Nakasone, Takeshita, Uno

and now to Kaifu, the government has undergone upheaval which
raises questions concerning resolution of disputes with the U.S..
As the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) cedes power to the
Japan Socialist Party (JSP) after a thirty four year reign, the
central question is how this leadership change will affect
current defense, trade and foreign aid policies.

As the JSP

currently has the majority in the upper house of the Japanese
parliament,

it has tremendous power to block legislation formed

in the lower house where the LDP holds the majority.

The JSP has

stated that it will try to prevent the strategic allocation of
ODA in addition to limiting a military buildup.

It maintains

that Japan should be more independent from the U.S. in the
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formulation of its foreign policy.

However, the ability of the

JSP to drastically change the current military, economic and
foreign aid policies is limited.

Businesses play a great role in

promoting governmental policy especially in trade.

As economic

and military plans, linked to commercial interests, have already
been developed and approved, they would be difficult to suspend
through legislation.

Thus, in the near future, a continuation of

past policies is likely.
In addition to domestic instability, domestic opinion will
help shape Japan's future character.

As stated in chapter 2, the

ordinary Japanese citizen does not want Japan to become a
military power.

They want to contribute to the world through

diplomacy and foreign aid.

The extent to which governmental

policy accommodates these sentiments varies.

As shown earlier,

Japan's military budget has increased to meet its perceived needs
and, to a certain extent, those of the U.S..
support this increase because it is moderate.

The Japanese people
They would not

support a rapid increase in military expenditure and neither
would most foreign states.

Again, domestic perceptions of Japan

being led by a militaristic and expansionist government is
another factor preventing it from becoming a major military
power.

CONCLUSIONS
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The above external factors of foreign perceptions, growing
regionalism and military threats together with these internal
factors of domestic instability, domestic opinion and cultural
values are forging Japan's future world role.

Both Pax Nipponica

and Pax Consortium seem less likely because of their extremism.
Pax Nipponica, portraying Japan as the world hegemon based on its
economic strength and leaving open the possibility of Japan
achieving military power, is less likely.

Other states may

prevent this by forming alliances against Japan.

In addition,

Japan would continue to depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

The

likelihood of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons is limited by
domestic and foreign opinion.

The ability of Japan to act as a

lender of last resort and to maintain open markets especially to
less developed countries is limited because of structural
impediments.

Finally, the potential economic power generated

within EEC integration in 1992 and U.S.-Canada free-trade area
would limit dependence of these states on Japan for trade and
finance.

Japan's dominance as world economic power would thus be

constrained.
Pax Consortium, which portrays the world without a hegemon
and where international regimes facilitate the settlement of
disputes,

is also unlikely because it tends to downplay the

importance of state power on individual decision-making.

The

trend towards regionalism is raising fears concerning the
effectiveness of the GATT free trade regime.

As U.S. influence

declines relative to other states, will members of GATT continue
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to follow the principles and norms of that institution without
the leadership of its founder?
Concerning security regimes,

it is true that majors powers

such as the U.S. and the Soviet Union are conducting more arms
negotiations as they find they can no longer maintain current
levels of defense spending.

Also, in economic security,

coordination of monetary and financial policies among the Group
of Seven (G-7) represents a form of "consortium" as they are
becoming increasingly sensitive to others' choices.

Despite this

cooperation, the main feature of Pax Consortium, that is the
settlement of disputes by non-military means,

is not likely to

occur in the future as long as the threat of nuclear weapons
remains.5
This leaves Joint Hegemony and Pax Americana as the two most
likely future scenarios.
near future.

Joint Hegemony seems less likely in the

This partnership portrays Japan as the world and

regional economic power.

Although trends show that Japan may

inevitably become the economic power in Asia, replacing the U.S.;
as stated above, regional sentiments against this shift will slow
its development.

In the short term, both domestic and foreign

opinion will prevent Japan from translating its economic power
into military power.

The U.S. also does not want to reduce its

economic influence in the area to the point where Japan controls
all trade and financial flows.

5 Inoguchi, 26.
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Militarily, recent collaboration between the U.S. and Japan
on development of high-technology, especially for defense, may
push the two powers into joint hegemony.

On the other hand, the

current trade friction between the two countries may not enable
their economies to fully integrate,
alternative markets.

forcing them to seek

Whether or not current perceptions of Japan

based on historical fears change, this will influence the
possibility of joint hegemony with the U.S..
Finally, Pax Americana II seems most likely in the short
term.

Japan states that it wants to remain number two to the

U.S. while it continues to play its primary economic role.

As it

seeks to fulfill its role, Japan is diversifying its markets by
shifting offshore into the U.S. and other Asian and European
countries where the local economies can also benefit.

Although

they are eager to trade with Japan, Asian nations want the U.S.
to remain as the region's economic leader to counterbalance
Japan.
In addition, by answering U.S. burden-sharing demands that
it spend more on defense and give more ODA, this takes some
pressure off the U.S., enabling it to maintain its hegemonic role
at a lower level.

Although Japan is spending more on defense,

this increase is not enough to liberate it from the U.S. security
system in Asia.
These four scenarios all represent a form of cooperation and
type of interdependence between the U.S. and Japan.

They are not

based on equality, rather, they involve various types of
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asymmetric relationships.

Whether or not the two countries can

manage the current trade frictions and its spill-over effects
into the defense burden-sharing dispute is uncertain.

Over time,

Japan and the U.S. may learn from past mistakes and adjust
policies to mutual expectations.

The main problem, however,

identifying what these expectations include.
capabilities,

is

With shifting

interests are changing making it difficult to

clearly articulate goals.
In the long run, certain questions will arise concerning the
U.S.'s relationship with Japan.

On a broader level, will

stability of the international system require hegemonic
leadership or will international regimes play an increasingly
important role?

Relating this question to the U . S .-Japanese

case, what roles will each country assume in order to promote
stability?

Domestic politics plus the transformation of the

international system will significantly affect definitions of
interests and formulation of policy.

As trade seems to becoming

the main tool of foreign policy, and as the U.S. Congress gains
more control over decision-making in trade and foreign aid, what
effect will this transformation have on the effectiveness of U.S.
foreign policy?

Will the problems of bureaucratic politics

become more apparent within the U.S. and Japan, challenging
realist assumptions that the state is a unitary actor?

How will

this change affect the U .S .-Japanese relationship?
Similarly, the disruptive domestic political scene in Japan
raises questions concerning that country's future world role.
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Specifically, as the JSP gains the majority in the Upper House of
the Japanese parliament, how will this shift in power affect
foreign policy-making in Japan?

Will the JSP be able to

effectively block defense, trade and foreign aid legislation
submitted by the LDP which is more sympathetic to U.S. demands?
How will these changes affect the possibilities for Pax Americana
II and Joint Hegemony?

These are questions which will

undoubtedly arise as the relationship evolves.

In the mean time,

the basic structure of the relationship will remain the same
while certain modifications will forge Japan's new role under Pax
Americana II.
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